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1 Introduction
Despite recent setbacks for international trade due to renewed protectionist pressures, in the last
decades value chains have generally become more global in nature due to the increased partici-
pation of suppliers located across different countries. In this context, incomplete contracts and
contract enforcement continue to be a central issue when studying firms’ organizational choices.1
The two canonical approaches to confronting this issue are the ‘transaction costs’ theory of the
firm (Williamson, 1971, 1975, 1985) and the ‘property rights’ theory of the firm (Grossman and
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), which have helped understanding how specific institutional
features of different production locations affect firms’ organizational decisions. According to the
transaction cost approach, better contracting institutions reduce the hold-up problems associated
with outsourcing and facilitate the exploitation of the corresponding gains from specialization. Dif-
ferently, according to the property rights approach, better contracting institutions mitigate the need
to create investment incentives through outsourcing and allow firms to reap a larger share of the
final revenues through integration. Empirical studies, from Corcos et al. (2013) to Eppinger and
Kukharskyy (2017), have found strong evidence in favor of the property rights theory: better insti-
tutional quality increases the incidence of integration. There are exceptions, such as Defever and
Toubal (2013) who highlight that, in line with the transaction costs approach, outsourcing is more
frequently observed for more productive firms due to its higher organizational costs.
Most existing works on international trade and firm organization have, however, focused on hold-
up problems related to tangible assets, compelling Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) to underline
missing research on how the non-appropriable nature of knowledge may also affect firms’ organiza-
tional choices. Their comment gains particular salience in the case of sequential production along
supply chains. Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2014) emphasize the rationale for using vertical in-
tegration as a way to promote efficient intra-firm transfers of intangible inputs (such as marketing
know-how, intellectual property or R&D capital). They show that, in line with the property rights
theory, for US firms integration is not much of a tool to ensure a smooth flow of physical inputs from
upstream to downstream production stages, but rather a means to secure the efficient transmission
of technology along the value chain. Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) provide evidence that
knowledge transmission by US multinationals to their affiliates increases after IPR reforms in host
countries. Canals and Şener (2014) find that US firms substantially expand their outsourcing activ-
ities in high-tech industries as a response to IPR reforms in the host countries. Naghavi, Spies and
Toubal (2015) further show that, when outsourcing of complex products involves the sharing of tech-
nology with a supplier, French multinationals choose countries with better IPR enforcement. This is
in line with earlier work by Yang and Maskus (2001), who argue that countries with stronger patent
1See the vast literature on international trade and the boundaries of firms (e.g. Antràs, 2003, 2005; Antràs and
Helpman, 2004, 2008; Grossman and Helpman, 2002, 2003, 2005).
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rights attract larger arm’s length volumes of licensed technology. Finally, Kukharskyy (2019) shows
that better IPR quality weakens a headquarter’s threat of knowledge dissipation by its supplier,
reducing the need to use integration to protect its knowledge against imitation.
Against this backdrop, our aim is to follow up on the foregoing comment by Antràs and Rossi-
Hansberg (2009) in terms of both theory and empirical analysis. As for the former, we introduce
the concept of intangible assets in a property rights model of sequential value chains à la Antràs
and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019). In their models, in order to produce customized inputs,
suppliers along the value chain have to undertake relation-specific investments under contractual
incompleteness arising from the fact that the delivered quality of an input is not verifiable by
third parties (such as a court or an arbitrator) and an input of low quality cannot be used for
final production. Contractual incompleteness leads to ex-post Nash bargaining on the suppliers’
contributions to final revenues. Faced with the possibility of being held-up at the ex-post bargaining
stage, input suppliers underinvest in the relation with the final producer. The latter can alleviate
the resulting hold-up inefficiency by appropriately choosing the organization of production facing a
trade-off between surplus extraction (which is better served by the vertical integration of the supplier)
and supplier incentivization (which is better served by an arm’s length outsourcing contract). In
our model, the choice between integration and outsourcing is also affected by the fact that, in order
to support input customization, firms have to transmit knowledge to their suppliers. However, to
avoid knowledge dissipation, they also have to protect the transmitted intangibles, the cost of which
depends on the knowledge intensity of inputs and the quality of institutions protecting intellectual
property rights (IPR) in the suppliers’ locations.
As in Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019), also in our model the profit-maximizing
organizational choice depends on whether suppliers’ relation-specific investments are complements or
substitutes along the value chain. If they are complements, when outsourcing and integration coexist,
the former is chosen upstream while the latter takes place downstream. If they are substitutes, the
opposite pattern holds. Once issues related to IPR are factored in, also the variation of knowledge
intensity across sequential inputs affects the trade-off between surplus extraction and supplier incen-
tivization as the firm’s organizational decision about any input is not independent from its decision
on how much knowledge to transmit along the entire value chain. In particular, when the knowledge
intensity of inputs increases (decreases) downstream and suppliers’ investments are complements,
the probability of integrating a randomly selected input is decreasing (increasing) in the quality of
IPR protection and increasing (decreasing) in the relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs.
Opposite but weaker predictions hold when suppliers’ investments are substitutes.
Intuitively, if relatively less knowledge is transmitted upstream of a given stage z and suppliers’
investments are sequential substitutes, a firm is less likely to use outsourcing at that stage, favor-
ing rent extraction over supplier incentivization. The reason is that, with less upstream knowledge
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transmission, upstream suppliers contribute less to the firm’s revenues and, with sequential substi-
tutability, that raises supplier z’s return on investment. Differently, if relatively less knowledge is
transmitted upstream of z but suppliers’ investments are sequential complements, the firm is less
likely to use vertical integration at stage z, favoring supplier incentivization over rent extraction as
the limited contribution of upstream suppliers to the firm’s revenue reduces supplier z’s return to in-
vestment. These effects associated with knowledge transmission interfere with the hold-up effects of
contractual incompleteness already highlighted by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019)
in the case of sequential production. Their relevance is, however, mitigated when the quality of IPR
protection improves.
Turning to the empirical analysis, we test our model’s predictions through probit regressions
exploiting comprehensive data on the population of Slovenian firms from 2007 to 2010. We merge
transaction-level trade data on firms with their outward cross-border direct investment and finan-
cial data. Transaction-level trade data provide us with information on the complete set of inputs
imported at the firm level, while FDI data gives us the country of affiliates. The firm’s decision to
integrate an input is estimated at the firm-country-product level. It is measured as the probability
of transacting an input in a particular source country within firm boundaries, whereby distinguish-
ing between integration and outsourcing by exploiting information on the core activity of the firm’s
affiliate in a particular host country, in the wake of Alfaro et al. (2019). To locate the position of
inputs along a value chain, we use industry-pair specific measures of upstreamness as in Alfaro et
al. (2019) and, to determine whether inputs are sequential complements or substitutes, we use the
demand elasticity of the firm’s core export product as in Antràs and Chor (2013), as well as the de-
mand elasticity of its inputs and a measure of their technological substitutability. Finally, to define
the knowledge intensity of inputs, we follow the Eurostat classification based on the R&D intensity
of their industry and, to measure the quality of IPR protection, we take the IPR enforcement index
from Park (2008).
We find that our model’s predictions hold at the most disaggregated level when controlling for
unobserved firm-specific effects as in Mundlak (1978), Chamberlain (1984) and Wooldridge (2002),
and for firm-country-product level unobserved heterogeneity when using a random effects probit
model. Moreover, in line with the model, we find that better overall contract enforcement (‘rule
of law’) has the opposite impact than better IPR quality, which suggests that better institutions
may have very different effects on firm organization depending on whether they improve the protec-
tion of tangible or intangible assets. It also shows that our findings are specific to IPR institutions
and cannot be generalized to other regulatory measures that affect contract enforcement. All our
findings are robust to alternative specifications and definitions of integration/outsourcing and com-
plements/substitutes, as well as to the inclusion of a battery of firm-level controls and additional
source-country institutional variables.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of our theoretical
framework through a simple model of a supply chain consisting of two production stages only: a
downstream final stage and an upstream intermediate stage. Section 3 extends the simple model
to a richer setup of sequential production, which we use to derive empirically testable predictions.
Section 4 presents the data and the variables we use for our empirical analysis. Section 5 tests the
predictions of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Intangibles and Intellectual Property Protection
To understand how knowledge transmission affects the organization of a value chain, it is useful
to start by introducing a simple theory of knowledge dissipation into a property rights framework
with hold-up inefficiencies where the supply chain consists of two production stages only: a final
stage performed by a ‘firm’ and a single intermediate stage of production performed by a ‘supplier’.
The supplier has to solve a series of problems and come up with solutions for the provision of a
fully customized (‘tangible’) input to the firm. The firm then uses the input to produce and sell a
differentiated final product with market power that allows for the extraction of monopolistic rents
from consumers. The supply contract is incomplete, giving rise to a hold-up problem that the firm
deals with through an organizational choice between vertically integrating the supplier and relying
on the supplier as an independent outsourced contractor.
Input customization requires the transmission of firm-specific knowledge (‘intangibles’) from the
final producer to the supplier. The more knowledge is transmitted, the closer the input is to the
firm’s specifications and thus the higher is the input’s productivity when used for final production
by the firm. However, transmitted knowledge has to be protected by the firm to avoid the risk of
‘dissipation’. This arises from the existence of a large number of potential competitors in the final
market that, from any bit of unprotected knowledge, can reverse engineer all knowledge needed to
reproduce the final product by themselves, thus destroying the firm’s monopolistic rents. In other
words, knowledge transmitted without protection by the firm becomes a public good.
In this setup, as it will be discussed in detail below, two problems affect the supplier’s incentive
to invest in relation-specific customization: the ‘hold-up problem’ due to the incompleteness of the
supply contract, and the ‘knowledge transmission problem’ due to costly knowledge protection.
2.1 Hold-up and knowledge transmission
Consider an industry in which the final good is available in many differentiated varieties, each
manufactured by a monopolistically competitive firm. Preferences are described by a standard CES
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where q is quantity demanded, p is price, A > 0 is a demand shifter that the firm treats as exogenous,
and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the price elasticity of final demand with the elasticity of substitution
between varieties equal to 1/(1− ρ).
Final production of each variety requires a customized intermediate input and customization
requires knowledge transmission from the firm to the input supplier. Specifically, final production
obeys the linear technology
q = θδx, (2)
where q ≥ 0 is the amount of final output, x ≥ 0 is the amount of intermediate input, θ > 0 is
the firm’s productivity, and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the input’s productivity as determined by the amount of
knowledge transmitted by the firm to the supplier. With δ = 0 no knowledge is transmitted and
intermediate production cannot take place; with δ = 1 all relevant knowledge is transmitted and the
input’s productivity is at its maximum.
In order to produce the customized input, the supplier has to undertake a relation-specific in-
vestment under contractual incompleteness. This is because the delivered quality of the input is
not verifiable by third parties (such as a court or an arbitrator) and an input of low quality cannot
be used for final production. Contractual incompleteness leads to ex-post Nash bargaining on the
joint surplus from the relation, that is, on the revenues generated by final sales. When bargaining
ex post, both parties have no outside option. For the supplier, once produced, the customized input
has no value outside the relation with the firm. As for the firm, should it be unhappy with the
delivered input, it would be too late to find an alternative supplier. Faced with the possibility of
being held-up at the ex-post bargaining stage, the supplier underinvests in the relation.
The final producer can alleviate the resulting hold-up inefficiency by appropriately choosing the
organization of production between the vertical integration of the supplier (labeled V ) or an arm’s
length outsourcing contract (labeled O). Under vertical integration the final producer is in control
of the physical assets used in intermediate production, which allows the firm to extract more surplus
from the supplier when it comes to ex-post bargaining. This feature is captured by assuming that the
firm’s Nash bargaining weight β ∈ (0, 1) is larger under vertical integration than under outsourcing
(βV > βO) so that the firm appropriates a larger share of joint surplus under the former than the
latter. However, foreseeing a lower return on its relation-specific investment, an integrated supplier is
inevitably more prone to underinvest in its relationship with the firm than an independent supplier.
Accordingly, the firm’s organizational choice faces a trade-off between surplus extraction and supplier
incentivization.
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The final production technology (2) highlights the importance of knowledge transmission: the
more knowledge is transmitted from the firm to the supplier, the higher the input’s productivity.
However, to avoid dissipation and rent destruction, knowledge transmission has to be protected.
This is costly and the cost depends on both the characteristics of the input in terms of ‘knowledge
intensity’ and those of the country where the input is produced in terms of IPR quality. Specifically,
the cost of protecting an amount δ of transmitted knowledge is assumed to be
κ(ω, λ) = ω δλ, (3)
where ω > 0 measures the input’s knowledge intensity and λ > 0 measures the country’s quality
of IPR institutions.2 The cost of protecting knowledge transmission is increasing in the amount of
knowledge transmitted δ. For given δ, it is higher the larger is input-specific knowledge intensity
(i.e. the larger is ω): more knowledge-intensive inputs are more difficult to protect from knowledge
dissipation. It is also higher the worse is country-specific IPR quality (i.e. the smaller is λ). Given
that from any bit of unprotected knowledge, potential competitors can reverse engineer all knowledge
needed to reproduce the final product, all transmitted knowledge will be protected in equilibrium.
2.2 Organizational choice
The timing of events is as follows. First, the firm chooses the organizational form β ∈ {βV , βO} and
the amount of transmitted knowledge δ ∈ [0, 1]. Second, the firm posts a contract for the provision
of the customized input, stating the chosen organizational form and knowledge transmission. Both
are verifiable by third parties and thus contractible. Third, a large number of identical potential
suppliers competitively bid for the contract and the firm selects one among them. Fourth, the
selected supplier decides how much to invest in the relationship with the firm, that is, how much to
supply of the intermediate input x. Fifth, the firm and the supplier bargain on how to share their
joint surplus consisting of revenues from final sales. Sixth and last, final production takes place,
output is sold and revenues are shared according to the agreed split rule.
Given this timing, the model has to be solved backwards, characterizing first the supplier’s
decision on x and then the firm’s decisions of β and δ. As for the former, taking β ∈ {βV , βO} and
δ ∈ [0, 1] as given, the supplier chooses x so as to maximize its profit
πS = (1− β) r(x)− c x, (4)
where c is the marginal cost of input production, r(x) = θρA1−ρ(δx)ρ is revenues from final sales,
and (1−β) is the supplier’s share of these revenues. The profit-maximizing amount of input supplied
2For example, in the case of protection through patenting, κ(ω, λ) would compound the difficulty of filing and
getting a patent approved with the cost of enforcing the patent.
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to the firm then evaluates to











which highlights that the supplier’s relation-specific investment is increasing in its share of surplus
(1 − β). This confirms that, given βV > βO, the supplier’s investment is higher with outsourcing
than with vertical integration.
Turning to final production, anticipating the supplier’s choice (5), the firm selects β ∈ {βV , βO}











1−ρ − ωδλ, (6)
where the cost of protected knowledge transmission (3) is subtracted from the firm’s share of final
revenues βr(x∗). The optimal choice of β is thus independent from δ as it maximizes β(1− β)
ρ
1−ρ .
Specifically, if the firm’s problem were ‘relaxed’ so that the firm’s bargaining weight β were not
constrained to be either βV or βO but could instead take any value between 0 and 1, the firm would
optimally set β at β+ ≡ 1 − ρ, as doing so would satisfy the corresponding first-order condition
whatever the value of δ. This implies that three cases arise for the constrained optimization. The
first two cases are unambiguous: for βO < βV < β
+ the firm necessarily prefers vertical integration
to outsourcing, whereas for β+ < βO < βV it necessarily prefers outsourcing to vertical integration.
Hence, vertical integration is the firm’s optimal choice when ρ is small enough, and outsourcing
is its optimal choice when ρ is large enough. This reveals that, when the demand is more elastic
(larger ρ), the firm is more inclined to outsource (smaller β+), whereas a more rigid demand (smaller
ρ) increases the firm’s propensity to integrate (larger β+). Intuitively, lower vales of the demand
elasticity (smaller ρ) make the firm’s revenues more concave in output, hence the firm gives more
weight to rent extraction through integration than to increasing scale by incentivizing the supplier
through outsourcing. In the third and last case, for βO < β
+ < βV the firm’s choice depends on
other parameter restrictions determining whether πF is larger for βO or βV . Nonetheless, the general
insight that more rigid demand favors vertical integration holds true.
For any given β, the first-order condition for the maximization of (6) with respect to δ implies


















where λ > ρ/(1− ρ) is assumed to hold for the second-order condition to be satisfied. This reveals
that, as the optimally chosen β maximizes β (1− β)
ρ
1−ρ , the preferred organizational choice is asso-
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ciated with more knowledge transmission than the alternative. In other words, the organizational
choice that more efficiently deals with the hold-up problem happens to be also the one that maxi-
mizes knowledge transmission. In addition, expression (7) also reveals that, once the organizational
form β has been chosen, larger ω leads to lower δ∗ as protecting knowledge transmission is more
costly. We highlight this result as:
Lemma 1 In a value chain consisting of two stages, the final producer prefers vertical integration
to outsourcing when the elasticity of final demand is low. Irrespective of the organizational form
chosen, higher input knowledge intensity discourages knowledge transmission from the final producer
to the input supplier, but does not affect the organizational choice.
We now show that this independence between the parallel decisions on organization and knowl-
edge transmission does not carry through to more complex sequential production.3
3 Sequential Production and Intangibles
We now assume that producing the final good requires a unit measure of inputs that have to be
sequentially supplied, each of them corresponding to a different stage of a long value chain as in
Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al (2019). We index each stage by z ∈ [0, 1] such that z = 0
is the first stage to be performed (i.e. the most ‘upstream’), and z = 1 is the last one (i.e. the
most ‘downstream’). At the end of each stage z, a certain amount of the corresponding input x(z)
is delivered to the next stage of production for further reprocessing, so that any further stage brings
the associated intermediate input closer to the one needed for final production (which was the only
input in the previous section).







where: α ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of substitutability between the different inputs, measuring the extent
to which less processing at a given stage can be compensated by more processing at another stage;
δ(z) is the productivity of input z; and I(z) is an indicator function taking value 1 if stage z has been
completed and 0 otherwise. This last feature is what makes the production process described by
(8)) inherently ‘sequential’: downstream stages are useless, unless inputs from upstream stages have
been delivered. To avoid unenlightening complexity, we assume that, at each stage of the production
process, if the two parties cannot find an agreement, both the firm and the supplier are capable of
3Independence comes from our assumption that the cost of protecting knowledge transmission does not vary with
the firm’s organizational choice. While we make this assumption in order to highlight the distinct role of sequential
production in knowledge transmission, Appendix A1 analyzes the alternative case in which the organizational choice
indeed affects the cost of knowledge protection in a two-stage setup.
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producing a zero-value-added input at a zero marginal cost, which simply allows for the continuation
of the production process but does not contribute to increase the value of final production.
At each stage of the value chain the firm faces the same hold-up problem described in the previous
section, and has to protect knowledge transmission to avoid dissipation. In particular, at generic
stage z the cost of protection resembles (3):
κ(ω(z), λ) = ω(z)δ(z)λ, (9)
where knowledge intensity ω(z) is now allowed to vary across inputs.
The timing of events follows the same logic as before. First, the firm chooses the organizational
form β ∈ {βV , βO} and the amount of transmitted knowledge δ(z) ∈ [0, 1] for all stages z ∈ [0, 1].
Second, the firm posts a contract for the provision of each customized input z, stating the corre-
sponding chosen organizational form and knowledge transmission. Third, for each stage z a large
number of identical potential suppliers competitively bid for the corresponding contract and the firm
selects one of them. Fourth, the selected suppliers decide how much to invest in their relationships
with the firm, that is, how much to supply of their intermediate input x(z). Fifth, the firm and each
supplier z bargain on how to split their joint surplus consisting of the corresponding stage’s marginal
contribution r′(z) to final revenues r(z). Sixth and last, final production takes place, output is sold
and revenues are shared among all value chain participants according to the agreed split rules. As
the simple model, also this extended model has to be solved backwards, characterizing first the
suppliers’ decision on x(z) and then the firm’s decisions of β(z) and δ(z).
3.1 Intermediate supplies
The choice of optimal investment x(z) by a supplier at stage z mimics the supplier’s decision in the
previous section, the only exception being that now the joint surplus consists of stage z’s incremental























Expression (10) shows that supplier z’s contribution can be either increasing or decreasing in the
revenues r(z) secured up to the stage z, depending on the elasticity of final demand (ρ) and the
degree of complementarity between the different inputs (α). If ρ > α holds, r′(z) is increasing
in r(z) so that higher investments by upstream suppliers raise the marginal return of supplier z’s
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own investment. Following Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019), we will refer to this
case as ‘sequential complementarity’ given that more investment by upstream suppliers incentivizes
investment by downstream suppliers. On the contrary, if ρ < α holds, more upstream investment
disincentivizes investment by downstream suppliers. We will therefore refer to this second case as
‘sequential substitutability’.
For given β(z) ∈ {βV , βO} and δ(z) ∈ [0, 1], the supplier then chooses x(z) so as to maximize
πS(z) = (1− β(z)) r′(z)− c x(z). (12)
Given (10) and (11), the supplier’s incentive to provide the input increases with its share of surplus




































3.2 Value chain organization
Turning to the firm, for all stages, the final producer chooses β(z) ∈ {βV , βO} and δ(z) ∈ [0, 1] so




[β(z) r′(z)− κ(ω(z), λ)] dz (14)
anticipating the optimal input provision of all its suppliers, x∗(z) for z ∈ [0, 1]. Given (10), (11) and
(13)), the firm’s profit (14) can be rewritten as
































4To obtain x∗(z), we first express the first-order condition of the supplier’s maximization problem in terms of x(z)
as a function r(z), and then we plug the resulting expression into (10). This delivers a separable differential equation
that can be solved for r(z). The solution, substituted in the supplier’s first-order condition, delivers (13).
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3.2.1 Organizational choice for given knowledge transmission
As done before for the simple model, the result of the maximization of the firm’s profit (15) can
be characterized by initially neglecting the constraint β(z) ∈ {βV , βO}. In particular, without such
constraint, the first-order condition with respect to β(z) can be used to express the firm’s optimally-
chosen bargaining weight at stage z as






























captures the differential in (weighted) average transmitted knowledge between stages located up-
stream and downstream of stage z. Accordingly, ∆(z) is an index of ‘upstream knowledge trans-
mission’, which is positive when more knowledge is transmitted upstream, and negative when more
knowledge is transmitted downstream.
Expression (16) shows that here, differently from the previous section, the firm’s organizational
choice for stage z is not independent from its decision on how much knowledge to transmit along
the value chain. In particular, given ρ ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1), (16) implies that the more knowledge
is transmitted upstream of z in relative terms, the smaller is the firm’s unconstrained optimal
bargaining weight at stage z whenever suppliers’ investments are sequential substitutes (ρ < α).
Differently, the more knowledge is transmitted upstream of z in relative terms, the larger is the firm’s
unconstrained optimal bargaining weight at stage z whenever suppliers’ investments are sequential
complements (ρ > α). In other words, if relatively more knowledge is transmitted upstream of z and
suppliers’ investments are sequential substitutes, the firm is more likely to use outsourcing (smaller
β+(z)) at stage z, favoring supplier incentivization over rent extraction. The reason is that, with
more upstream knowledge transmission, upstream suppliers contribute more to the firm’s revenues
and, with sequential substitutability, that reduces supplier z’s return on investment (smaller r′(z)).
If relatively more knowledge is transmitted upstream of z but suppliers’ investments are instead
sequential complements, the firm is more likely to use vertical integration (larger β+(z)) at stage z,
favoring rent extraction over supplier incentivization, as the contribution of upstream suppliers to
the firm’s revenues raises supplier z’s return to investment (larger r′(z)).
Before characterizing knowledge transmission at the different stages, it is useful to contrast our
model with that of Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019). Ours embeds theirs in the
special case of complete knowledge transmission at all stages: δ(z) = 1 for all z ∈ [0, 1]. In this case
∆(z) = 0 holds and (16) boils down to β+(z) = 1 − αz
α−ρ
1−α . Accordingly, the firm’s unconstrained
optimal bargaining weight β+(z) is a decreasing function of input ‘upstreamness’ z with sequential
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complements (ρ > α), while it is an increasing function of z with sequential substitutes (ρ < α).
To map β+(z) into the binary choice between βO and βV , one can follow the same logic we
used above for the two-stage value chain: stage z is necessarily integrated if βO < βV < β
+(z) and
outsourced if β+(z) < βO < βV . Hence, given that with ρ < α the function β
+(z) decreases with
z, sufficient conditions for integrated and outsourced stages to coexist along the value chain under
substitutability are β+(0) > βV and β
+(1) < βO. As for ρ < α we have limz→0 β
+(0) = 1 and
β+(1) = 1− α, the exact parameter condition is 1− α < βO. Differently, given that with ρ > α the
function β+(z) increases with z, sufficient conditions for integrated and outsourced stages to coexist
along the value chain under complementarity are β+(0) < βO and β
+(1) > βV . As for ρ > α we
have limz→0 β
+(0) = −∞ and β+(1) = 1− α, the exact parameter condition is 1− α > βV .













is an increasing function of z. The only twist here is that we have
z+∆(z) > z when more knowledge is transmitted upstream, and z+∆(z) < z when more knowledge
is transmitted downstream.
The monotonicity of z + ∆(z) ensures that, analogously to Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro
et al. (2019), when mapping β+(z) into the binary choice between βO and βV , expression (16)
implies that the decision on which stages to integrate or outsource obeys a cutoff rule. In the case
of sequential complements (ρ > α), there is a cutoff stage z∗C ∈ [0, 1] at which the firm is indifferent
between the two organizational forms and such that all upstream stages are outsourced, while all
downstream stages are integrated: β(z) = βO for z ∈ [0, z∗C ] and β(z) = βV for z ∈ (z∗C , 1]. This
cutoff is implicitly determined by
z∗C + ∆(z
∗























Differently, in the case of sequential substitutes (ρ < α), the cutoff stage z∗S ∈ [0, 1] at which the firm
is indifferent between the two organizational forms is such that all upstream stages are integrated,
while all downstream stages are outsourced: β(z) = βV for z ∈ [0, z∗S) and β(z) = βO for z ∈ [z∗S , 1].
This threshold is implicitly determined by
z∗S + ∆(z
∗
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Clearly, when knowledge transmission is complete at all stages (∆(z) = 0), both (17) and (18) boil
down to the corresponding expressions in Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019).
We can summarize these cutoff results in the following propositions.
Proposition 2 When suppliers’ investments are complements (ρ > α), there exists a cutoff stage
z∗C such that all upstream stages are outsourced and all downstream stages are integrated.
Proposition 3 When suppliers’ investments are substitutes (ρ < α), there exists a cutoff stage z∗S
such that all upstream stages are integrated and all downstream stages are outsourced.
3.2.2 Knowledge transmission for chosen organization
The cutoff rule guiding the decision on which stages to integrate or outsource allows us to decompose
LF in the profits generated by the outsourced stages and those generated by the integrated stages.
Then, depending on whether we consider sequential substitutes or complements, we can use (17) or


















with Γ (βV , βO) ≡ ΓC (βV , βO) for ρ > α, and Γ (βV , βO) ≡ ΓS (βV , βO) for ρ < α.5
Optimal knowledge transmission δ∗(z) solves the first-order condition for the maximization of
(19)) with respect to δ(z), which yields









































so that the implicit definitions (17) and (18) of the cutoffs can be restated as
z∗C + z
∗




S(1− z∗S)Ω(z∗S) = HS , (22)
5The expressions of the two bundling parameters ΓC (βV , βO) and ΓS (βV , βO) are reported in Appendix A2 and







































captures the differential in (weighted) average knowledge intensity between stages located upstream
and downstream of stage z. Accordingly, Ω(z) can be interpreted as an index of ‘upstream knowledge
intensity’, which is positive when upstream stages are more knowledge intensive than downstream
ones, and negative when the opposite holds. When knowledge intensity is uniform across all stages
(i.e. ω(z) = ω > 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1]), transmitted knowledge is also the same (i.e. δ(z) = δ > 0
for all z ∈ [0, 1]) so that we have both Ω(z) = 0 and ∆(z) = 0, which brings us back to the cutoff
expressions in Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019).
3.3 Comparative statics and empirical predictions
The model delivers clear-cut predictions on how IPR quality affects the organization of the value
chain when knowledge intensity is a monotonic function of z. For concreteness, consider the specific
functional forms ω(s) = eωs and ω(s) = eω(1−s) such that knowledge intensity rises and falls re-
spectively with downstreamness, at the constant rate ω > 0.6 This rate then measures the ‘relative
knowledge intensity’ of the part of the value chain more costly to protect from knowledge dissipation:



















for r = {C, S} with Hr ∈ (0, 1) ensuring z∗r ∈ (0, 1); differently, under falling knowledge intensity
ω(s) = eω(1−s) we get









for f = {C, S} with Hf ∈ (0, 1) ensuring z∗f ∈ (0, 1).
The cutoffs’ expressions (24) and (25) are amenable to clear-cut comparative statics results that
can be brought to data. In particular, with respect to IPR protection and knowledge intensity, (24)
















so that we can state:
Proposition 4 When inputs’ knowledge intensity increases (decreases) downstream and suppliers’
investments are complements (ρ > α), the cutoff stage z∗C is increasing (decreasing) in IPR quality
(λ) and decreasing (increasing) in the relative knowledge intensity of downstream (upstream) inputs
(ω).
Proposition 5 When inputs’ knowledge intensity increases (decreases) downstream and suppliers’
investments are substitutes (ρ < α), the cutoff stage z∗S is increasing (decreasing) in IPR quality (λ)
and decreasing (increasing) in the relative knowledge intensity of downstream (upstream) inputs (ω).
Moreover, given definition (23), the impact of λ on µ and therefore on the cutoffs is small for
large α, which is more likely the case with substitutes than complements. Hence we can state:
Proposition 6 The cutoff stages are less responsive to different levels of IPR quality when suppliers’
investments are substitutes (ρ < α) than when they are complements (ρ > α).
Together with Propositions 2 and 3, Propositions 4, 5 and 6 can be turned into empirical predic-
tions on the probability of integrating the supply of any randomly selected input as follows. Consider
some continuous distribution of inputs across stages z with c.d.f. G(z) for z ∈ [0, 1]. Then, according
to the model, the probability that a randomly picked input is integrated equals 1 − G(z∗C) in the
case of complements, and G(z∗S) in the case of substitutes. This implies that the probability of
integration decreases with z∗C in the former case, whereas it increases with z
∗
S in the latter.
The empirical implications of our propositions can be thus summarized as follows.
(A) Based on Propositions 2 and 3, as in Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019),
the probability of integrating a randomly selected input increases (decreases) with its upstreamness
along the value chain in the case of substitutability (complementarity).
(B) Based on Proposition 4, when inputs’ knowledge intensity increases (decreases) downstream
and suppliers’ investments are complements, the probability of integrating a randomly selected
input is decreasing (increasing) in IPR quality and increasing (decreasing) in the relative knowledge
intensity of downstream inputs.
(C) Based on Proposition 5, when inputs’ knowledge intensity increases (decreases) downstream
and suppliers’ investments are substitutes, the probability of integrating a randomly selected input is
increasing (decreasing) in IPR quality and decreasing (increasing) in the relative knowledge intensity
of downstream inputs.
(D) Based on Proposition 6, the impact of IPR quality on the probability of integrating a ran-
domly selected input is stronger with sequential complementarity than substitutability.
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Intuitively, when IPR quality is perfect, all transmitted knowledge is costlessly protected. Knowl-
edge intensity is thus immaterial and our model coincides with the one by Antràs and Chor (2013): if
suppliers’ investments are complements, upstream stages are outsourced and downstream stages are
integrated; if they are substitutes, the reverse pattern holds. When instead knowledge transmission
is costly due to imperfect IPR quality, knowledge intensity matters.
Take, for instance, the case of complements when knowledge intensity increases with downstream-
ness. In the presence of complementarity, the chosen cutoff stage strikes the optimal balance between
upstream supplier incentivization through outsourcing and downstream surplus extraction through
integration. Going from perfect to imperfect IPR quality reduces the amount of knowledge transmit-
ted, but especially downstream given that knowledge intensity increases with downstreamness. The
implication is that lower IPR quality decreases the revenues generated by all stages, but especially
those by the downstream ones. As it is therefore the vertically integrated part of the value chain
that suffers more, the initial balance between upstream supplier incentivization and downstream
surplus extraction is broken in favor of the former. Accordingly, to restore the optimal balance, the
firm has to start integrating more upstream. This explains why the cutoff stage z∗C moves towards
z = 0, with an increased measure of integrated stages. Vice versa, an improvement in IPR quality,
shifts the cutoff stage in the opposite direction, thus implying a decreased probability of integrating
a randomly selected input.
The pattern is reversed in the case of substitutes when knowledge intensity again increases with
downstreamness. In the presence of substitutability, the chosen cutoff stage strikes the optimal
balance between upstream surplus extraction through integration and downstream supplier incen-
tivization through outsourcing. Going from perfect to imperfect IPR quality, less knowledge is again
transmitted, especially downstream. Hence, the optimal balance between upstream surplus extrac-
tion and downstream supplier incentivization is broken in favor of the former. The firm restores
the optimal balance by starting to outsource more upstream. As a result, the cutoff stage z∗S moves
towards z = 0, with an increased measure of outsourced stages. Vice versa, an improvement in
IPR quality shifts the cutoff in the opposite direction, thus implying an increased probability of
integrating a randomly selected input.
Analogously, higher relative downstream knowledge intensity reinforces relative knowledge trans-
mission upstream, resulting in a higher probability of integration of a randomly selected input when
supplier investments are complements, and of outsourcing when they are substitutes.
4 Data and Key Variables
The dataset we use is composed of four distinct databases covering the population of Slovenian firms
in the 2007-2010 period. Our core database includes transaction-level trade data at the 8-digit level
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of the European Combined Nomenclature (hereinafter CN) classification provided by the Statistical
Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS). Using the unique firm identifiers, this transaction-level
trade database is merged with (i) detailed information on the direction of firms’ cross-border foreign
direct investment (FDI) outflows provided by the Bank of Slovenia and (ii) firms’ financial statements
data from the Agency for Public Legal Records and Related Services (APLR). Hence, we have at
our disposal firms’ annual export and import transactions to/from partner countries as well as their
outward FDI positions in the respective host partner countries. Additionally, we use a database on
the performance of the foreign affiliates of Slovenian firms provided by the Bank of Slovenia, which
contains further information on affiliates’ performance, core industry of activity and trade flows,
such as total exports and imports of affiliates, their total intra-firm trade and sales in the local
(host) market. In our final sample, we have 5241 firms sourcing from 61 different partner countries.
Slovenian data are particularly well suited for studying firm organization behavior along interna-
tional value chains. Slovenia is a small, highly open economy from the group of Central and Eastern
European transition economies that has been heavily involved in both multilateral liberalization and
regional integration processes since the mid-1990s. This involvement has been mostly related to ap-
proaching EU membership through: (i) accession to the GATT (WTO) in 1994 (1995); (ii) CEFTA
membership in 1996; (iii) signing of an Association Agreement with the EU in 1996 with provisional
enforcement in 1997; and (iv) EU accession negotiations between 1998-2002. In year 2004, Slovenia
became a full member of the EU and adopted the Euro in 2007 as the first new EU member state.
Liberalization processes contributed to the increasing involvement of Slovenian companies in global
value chains (GVC). According to the WTO, Slovenia is classified among the high GVC participation
economies. It recorded a GVC participation index of 58.7 in 2011 that is significantly above the
average value for developed and developing countries (48.6 and 48.0 respectively). The index is high
mostly on account of strong backward participation (WTO, 2016) as shown in Table 1, which is the
type of participation our model is about. Figures 1 and 2 also show the value-added components of
gross exports for Slovenia in 1995 and in 2011, together with the comparison between inward and
outward FDIs. It is clear from Figure 2 that the strongest steady increase in Slovenian outward FDI
stock has been recorded between 1999 and 2007, with the peak value in 2009, when also the gap
between inward and outward FDIs has been the smallest.
4.1 Dependent variable: binary variable on the decision to integrate
Our dependent variable is a firm’s propensity to transact an input in a particular source country
within its boundaries. It is the outcome of the firm’s binary decision on whether to integrate or
outsource the supply of the input from a given country. We define inputs at the 6-digit level product
groups of the CN classification, which is in full compliance with the 6-digit Harmonized system
(hereinafter HS) code. Transaction-level trade data provide us with information on the complete
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set of inputs sourced from abroad by a firm, while FDI data give the location of its dependent
establishments. However, as most related studies, we do not have information on the extent to
which the firm’s trade flows involve its dependent establishments (‘intra-firm trade’).
Antràs and Chor (2013) tackle this issue by exploiting available industry-level intra-firm trade
data and using the share of intra-firm imports in total inputs as an indication of the propensity to
transact a particular input within firm boundaries. The follow-up study by Alfaro et al. (2019)
proposes an alternative solution based on the activities of establishments linked via ownership ties
(net of subsidiaries of the ‘global ultimate owner’). While the former approach lacks information
on the identity (activity) of the individual buyer, the latter does not use trade data and relies
instead on input-output (‘I-O’) tables to determine the sets of integrated and outsourced inputs
without information on their source countries. We build on the latter approach in defining as traded
‘intra-firm’ or ‘integrated’ the inputs a parent firm imports from an affiliate’s host country that are
classified under the core activity of the affiliate, but we also exploit our detailed data to obtain the
whole set of import transactions from different source countries. More specifically, inputs that a
firm imports from its affiliate’s host country, if classified under the core activity of the affiliate at the
4-digit industry level, are regarded as ‘integrated’, whereas all other inputs that the firm imports
from that country are considered as ‘outsourced’. Doing this also accounts for the fact that a firm
may engage in both integration and outsourcing in a given country. If a firm has no FDI in a country,
all imports coming from that country are regarded as ‘outsourced’. This allows us to estimate the
regression model at the most disaggregated firm-input-country level. As we will see, it will also allow
us to consider a firm-input specific upstreamness measure for all bilateral transactions along a firm’s
sequential production.
We link the core activity of an affiliate and imported inputs by the parent company by first
adopting the RAMON concordance from 6-digit HS 2002 to 6-digit CPA 2002 classification, and
subsequently from CPA 2002 to NACE Rev. 1 at the 4-digit level based on the direct linkage in the
structure of these two classifications.7 In year 2007, the HS classification underwent a substantial
revision, therefore a pairing of HS6 2007 to HS6 2002 codes is required for the purpose of linking
the core activity of an affiliate with imported inputs. In converting HS 2007 to HS 2002 codes we
lean on the concordance approach of Van Beveren, Bernard and Vandenbussche (2012), but assign
one single code of the HS 2002 edition to each HS 2007 code. This requires certain simplifications in
the event that the HS 2007 code is the result of either merging (1 : n relationship) or splitting and
merging (n : n relationship) several codes in the previous 2002 classification. In this case, we follow
the United Nations Statistics Division (2009) and give priority to the one subheading among several
that has the same code as the HS 2007 subheading (if it exists). The retained code rule is based on
the general practice of the World Customs Organization to maintain the existing code only if there
7For manufactured goods the elements of the CPA product classification are based on the HS classification.
18
have been no substantial changes of its scope.
We use d integrihkjt to denote our dependent variable associated with a firm i that, in order
to produce its core product k, sources input h from country j in period t. The dependent variable
takes value 1 if in period t input h for product k is sourced by firm i from a country j where the
firm has an affiliate whose core activity belongs to the same 4-digit industry as the input. It takes
value 0 otherwise. For robustness check, we also define an alternative dependent variable based
on a stricter definition of ‘integrated’ input that exploits information we have on whether, in a
particular country-year, the affiliate reports positive intra-firm exports. This alternative dependent
variable (d integr IFEXihkjt) takes value 1 if two conditions are fulfilled: (i) input sourced from
the affiliate’s host country is classified under the core activity of the affiliate at the 4-digit industry
level (as for d integrihkjt), and (ii) the affiliate reports positive intra-firm exports in a given year.
It takes value 0 otherwise.
4.2 Sequential complementarity/substitutability
To distinguish between sequential substitutes and complements we first follow Antràs and Chor
(2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) and trace substitutes/complements based on low/high value of
import demand elasticity faced by the buyers of a particular good. We consider the import demand
elasticity of a firm i’s ‘core’ export product, that is, the product at the 6-digit level of the HS
classification that accounts for the largest share of the firm’s exports. As stressed by Antràs and
Chor (2013), this approach implies the assumption that any existing cross-industry variation in
the degree of technological substitution across a firm’s inputs (αi) is largely uncorrelated with the
demand of its core product (ρi). Complements (d complit = 1) are characterized by above-median
import demand elasticity for a firm’s core export product, whereas substitutes (d complit = 0) by
below-median demand elasticity. We use the import demand elasticity estimated at the 6-digit HS
product level for Slovenia by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) following the production-based GDP
function approach. This estimate is defined as the percentage change in the quantity of an imported
good when its price increases by 1%, holding the prices of all other goods, as well as the productivity
and the endowments of the economy, constant.
For robustness check, we complement the substitutes/complements measure of Antràs and Chor
(2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) in two ways. First, we propose a proxy for the parameter αi, based
on the presumption that the degree of technological input substitutability should be closely related
to the degree of input differentiation. In particular, we presume is that inputs classified within
the same industry at a given digit-level of classification exhibit higher technological substitutability
compared with inputs classified in different industries at the same level of aggregation. We then











where n indexes a 3-digit HS product category while N3digi and N6digi refer to the numbers of
3-digit and 6-digit HS product categories involving inputs imported by firm i. When all imported
inputs belong to the same 3-digit HS category n, we have N6digni = N6digi and thus Hi = 0. In
contrast, when each input is classified under a different 3-digit HS category, we have N6digni = 1,
N6digi = N3digi and thus Hi = 1 − (1/N3digi). As Hi increases with the dispersion of 6-digit
HS inputs across 3-digit product categories, we take it as an inverse measure of the technological
substitutability of the firm’s inputs αi. Finally, we compute average values of the Herfindahl index
across 3-digit industries to obtain industry-level inverse measures of technological substitutability.
Complements and substitutes are then distinguished by considering both the estimated import de-
mand elasticity of the core product and the industry-level average technological substitutability.
Specifically, after taking the product of a firm’s core import elasticity (in absolute value) and the
industry-level Herfindahl index, we define a dummy variable d complrho×alpha(ind.) that equals 1
when the product is above the median, and zero otherwise. The underlying logic is that the higher
the estimated import demand elasticity (in absolute value) and the higher the Herfindahl index, the
more likely it is that ρ > α holds and investment along the value chain are sequential complements.
Second, building on Alfaro et al. (2019), we consider that α should be closely related to the
elasticity of demand for each intermediate input in any given industry. Hence, we introduce another
measure of sequential substitutability defined as the weighted average of estimated demand elastic-
ities for a firm’s intermediate and capital good imports, with weights given by the firm’s import
shares. We take the difference between the firm’s core product import elasticity and the weighted
average of its intermediate and capital good import elasticities. We then define a dummy variable
d complrho−alpha(elast.) that equals 1 when the difference is larger than 0 (sequential complementar-
ity), and equals 0 otherwise (sequential substitutability).
In the robustness check Table 8 we will discuss later on, the columns corresponding to the three
alternative dummies are labeled by rho, rho× alpha(ind.) and rho− alpha(elast.) respectively.
4.3 Upstreamness/downstreamness
Since we observe import transactions at the firm-level, we are able to identify the position of each
imported input h along the value chain of any given product k. This allows us to follow Alfaro et al.
(2019) who define the upstreamness of input h in producing final output k as the weighted average















n=1 dhmdmndnk + ...
, (27)
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where dhk denotes the direct requirement coefficient of input h in output k with h, k = 1, ...,M . In
(27) the denominator is the sum of input h’s requirement coefficients that enter product k’s value
chain l stages away from final production for l = 1, 2, ...,∞. The numerator is also an infinite sum,
but there each term is multiplied by an integer that corresponds to the number of stages upstream
of k’s final production at which input h enters the value chain. A larger value of Upstrhk (which is
always greater than 1 by construction) means that a larger share of the total use value of input h is
accrued further upstream in the production process of product k.8
Based on (27), we compute the upstreamness of each input h imported by firm i from each source
country j for the final production of its core product k in year t, which we call Upstrihkjt. In doing
so, we take the direct requirement coefficients from the 2002 US Input-Output tables provided by
the Industry Benchmark Division (IBD) of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, since such detailed
tables are not available for Slovenia. US SIC/NAICS product classes and industries from the US
Direct Requirements matrix are matched to HS codes of firms’ core export products and imported in-
puts based on concordance from Pierce and Schott (2009) (available at: http://www.nber.org/data-
appendix/w15548/readme.txt).
4.4 Knowledge transmission
According to our model, the cost of protecting knowledge transmission is a function of two key
variables: the knowledge intensity of inputs and the quality of IPR institutions in the location of
production. We measure IPR quality as the logarithm of the Park (2008) index in source country j,
which is a widely used proxy for patent protection in the IPR literature.9 The variable is denoted
as lnIPRjt. In turn, we measure knowledge intensity by grouping inputs into products that are
or are not knowledge intensive, based on their R&D intensity. In doing so, we adopt the Eurostat
classification that, in line with the OECD, defines high-tech products as those featuring high levels
of R&D expenditure over total sales.10
The groups classified as high-tech are aggregated on the basis of the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) at 3-digit to 5-digit level, which we further translate to the HS classification
codes that we use in our dataset. To trace the knowledge intensity of inputs along the firm’s value
chain, we use the upstreamness measure Upstrihkjt described above. In particular, we compute
the ratio rel upst knintk as the average upstreamness of knowledge intensive inputs relative to that
of non-intensive inputs in the production of final product k, where the set of inputs used in k’s
production is identified based on the 2002 US Input-Output table.
8The fact that Upstrhk is specific to an input-product pair makes it different from the earlier measure of up-
streamness used by Fally (2012) and Antràs et al. (2012).
9See e.g. Maskus (2000, 2012).
10A detailed list of high-tech product groups as classified by the Eurostat is provided at the following link:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/hte esms an4.pdf. Further classification details can be found
at the url: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ cache/metadata/en/htec esms.htm.
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The use of rel upst knintk is twofold. First, we use it to proxy the difference in knowledge inten-
sity (or, equivalently, relative knowledge transmission) between upstream and downstream stages,
which corresponds to ω in our theoretical model. In this respect, rel upst knintk measures the
relative knowledge intensity of upstream stages when the upstream part of the value chain is more
knowledge intensive (i.e. when knowledge intensity decreases downstream); vice versa, its inverse
value (rel upst knintk)
−1 measures the relative knowledge intensity of downstream stages when the
downstream part of the value chain is more knowledge intensive (i.e. when knowledge intensity
increases downstream). Second, we use rel upst knintk also to discriminate between industries with
increasing and decreasing knowledge intensity as sequential production moves downstream. For this
purpose, we introduce a dummy variable d knint downstrk, which denotes that, along the value
chain of final product k, knowledge intensive inputs tend to be located more downstream. This
dummy takes the value 1 if the average upstreamness of knowledge intensive inputs is lower than
the average upstreamness of inputs not intensive in knowledge. It takes value 0 otherwise.
4.5 Descriptive statistics
For concreteness, Figure 3 shows the variation of firms’ core product groups in terms of their
import demand elasticity rhok and the relative upstreamness of their knowledge intensive inputs
(rel upst knintk). The latter is larger (smaller) than 1 when knowledge intensive (non-intensive) in-
puts tend to be located upstream along the value chain. The figure reveals no clear pattern of covari-
ation between complements/substitutes and knowledge intensity increasing/decreasing downstream
(or the relative knowledge intensity of upstream/downstream stages). It thus suggests that the pa-
rameters regulating sequential complementarity/substitutability and knowledge intensity along the
value chain are indeed independent as assumed in the model.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the pooled sample, and for the four subsamples where we
distinguish between complements and substitutes based on d compli, and between industries with in-
put knowledge intensity increasing and decreasing with downstreamness based on d knint downstrk.
Around 18% of import transactions are carried out by firms that report outward FDI activity in
at least one year, throughout the 2007-2010 period (see d OutFDI), and about 3% of transactions
by firms with outward FDI in a particular sourcing country in a given year (d OutFDI bilateral).
Among complements, both FDI shares are higher for firms with higher relative knowledge intensity
of upstream inputs. Among substitutes, we observe the opposite, with higher FDI shares recorded
among the firms characterized by higher relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs. However,
less than 0.1% of import transactions are regarded as integrated when the condition of being classified
under the core activity of the affiliate at the 4-digit industry level is applied (see d integr). The
percentage is slightly less when the additional condition of the existence of positive intra-firm exports
by affiliates is accounted for (d integr IFEX).
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The incidence of input integration is higher for industries characterized by higher relative knowl-
edge intensity of downstream inputs and the more so for substitutes. There are no notable differences
observed between complements and substitutes or upstream and downstream relative knowledge in-
tensity with respect to the average upstreamness of their inputs. Yet, firms operating in industries
with higher relative knowledge intensity downstream tend to source, on average, from countries with
better IPR institutions and rule of law implementation, both for complements and substitutes.
The four groups of firms are as well alike in terms of inputs’ demand elasticity and industry
Herfindahl index, which is in agreement with the presumption that the cross-industry variation in the
degree of technological substitution across firms’ inputs (α) is largely uncorrelated with the elasticity
of demand (ρ), again as assumed in the theoretical model. The four groups are further similar, on
average, in terms of their age, export propensity and financial leverage. However, firms with their
core export product characterized by sequential complementarity are, on average, smaller in terms of
number of employees and feature lower average capital intensity and slightly lower labor productivity.
The least capital-intensive production process with the lowest average labor productivity is evidenced
for sequential complements with high relative knowledge intensity of upstream inputs.
5 Empirical Specifications and Results
5.1 Empirical model specifications and methodological issues
Our database allows us to explore integration versus outsourcing decisions made not just across dif-
ferent inputs at the firm level but also across different input sourcing countries. As already discussed
in Section 4.1, the dependent variable in our specifications is a binary indicator (d integrihkjt) re-
porting whether or not in year t firm i with core export product k imports input h from source
country j within the firm’s boundaries. It is this source-country dimension that will distinguish our
specifications from Alfaro et al. (2019) and will allow us to test our model’s predictions, summarized
in Propositions 4-6, on how country-specific IPR quality affects a firm’s organization decision.
Specifically, we augment the empirical model of Antràs and Chor (2013) with the knowledge
intensity of inputs along the value chain and the quality of IPR institutions in the sourcing countries.
We test our predictions by means of three specifications. Specification (I) reads:
Pr(d integrihkjt = 1) = β0 + β1 Upstrihkjt + β2 d compli + β3 lnIPRjt +
+β4 Upstrihkjt ∗ d compli + β5 lnIPRjt ∗ d compli + β6 lnIPRjt ∗ Upstrihkjt +
+β7 lnIPRjt ∗ d compli ∗ Upstrihkjt + β8 d knint downstrk +
+β9 d knint downstrk ∗ d compli +X ′itβ10 +
∑
β11,k d industryk +
+
∑
β12,j d countryj +
∑
β13,t d yeart + uihkjt , (28)
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and applies to the pooled sample. In the expression above, Pr(d integrihkjt = 1) is the probability
that firm i producing product k integrates input h imported from country j in year t. Besides the
explanatory variables described in the previous section, specification (I) includes a vector Xit of
standard firm-specific controls: age, size, capital intensity of production, labor productivity, export
propensity and financial leverage. Size (sizeit) is measured by the number of employees. Age (ageit)
refers to years passed since the year of foundation reported in the Business Register of the Republic of
Slovenia. Capital-intensity (Kintensityit) is measured by fixed assets per worker, which according
to Olley and Pakes (1996) affect the distribution of future plant productivity and may act as a
proxy for unobserved sources of efficiency. Labor productivity (Lproductivityit) is defined as value
added per employee. Export propensity (Ex Propensityit) is measured by the share of exports in
total sales, while financial leverage as debt-to-assets ratio (Debt assetsit). We also include sets of
(i) annual dummy variables to control for macroeconomic shocks; (ii) partner country dummies to
account for country-specific time-invariant effects; and (iii) industry-specific effects, where a firm’s
industry affiliation is based on its core export product at the 1-digit level of the HS classification.
For specification (II) we split our sample between sequential complements and substitutes so as
to avoid the complexity of interpreting the triple interaction lnIPRjt ∗ d compli ∗Upstrihkjt. After
splitting the sample based on our alternative definitions of complements/substitutes, specification
(II) reads:
Pr(d integrihkjt = 1) = β0 + β1 Upstrihkjt + β2 lnIPRjt + β3 lnIPRjt ∗ Upstrihkjt +




β6,k d industryk +
+
∑
β7,j d countryj +
∑
β8,t d yeart + uihkjt .
To make further comparisons between different types of industries and institutions, we zoom in
specification (II) and split the complements subsample, for which intangible assets play a crucial
role according to both our theory and the evidence provided. In particular, we split the final
products depending on whether the knowledge intensity of inputs along their value chains increases
or decreases with downstreamness. This also allows us to augment the specification with the rate
at which knowledge intensity increases or decreases downstream (rel upst knintk). The resulting
specification (III) reads:
Pr(d integrihkjt = 1) = β0 + β1 Upstrihkjt + β2 lnIPRjt + β3 lnIPRjt ∗ Upstrihkjt +




β6,k d industryk +
+
∑
β7,j d countryj +
∑
β8,t d yeart + uihkjt .
All three specifications are estimated by probit, for which some remarks are in order. First,
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in line with heterogeneous firm dynamics models, the variability of firm growth usually decreases
with firm size, raising the concern that variance is not constant across firms. This could also
hold for firms’ integration decisions. Therefore, we test whether firm size affects the conditional
variance of the firm’s integration choice to detect potential heteroscedasticity. When Wald’s test for
heteroscedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedastic variance, we implement a maximum-
likelihood heteroscedastic probit model that generalizes the standard probit model by allowing the
scale of the inverse link function to vary from observation to observation as a function of firm
size. Second, to deal with potential endogeneity caused by unobserved firm-specific effects, we
employ a parameterization of unobserved firm-specific effects by firm-level means of all time-varying
independent variables over the sample period, as suggested by Mundlak (1978), Chamberlain (1984)
and Wooldridge (2002). Eventually, we opt for a random effects probit model in order to explicitly
exploit the panel structure of our data, thereby controlling for firm-country-product fixed effects as
random variables uncorrelated with the regressors.
5.2 Empirical results
5.2.1 Pooled sample results
Starting with specification (I), Table 3 depicts the results for the baseline case, where complements
and substitutes are defined based on the estimated import demand elasticity (rho). Column (1)
of the table shows the results of the probit model with robust standard errors adjusted for firm
clusters, whereas column (2) refers to the specification that includes firm-level means of all time-
varying independent variables over the sample period to control for unobserved firm-specific effects.
As Wald’s test fails to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedastic variance, ordinary pooled probit
results are reported. Column (3) instead reports the results estimated by the random effects probit
model controlling for unobserved heterogeneity for each firm-country-product that is invariant over
time. Column (4) adds industry and country dummies to the random effect probit estimation. The
likelihood-ratio test confirms the importance of unobserved heterogeneity (‘frailty’) in these specifi-
cations. For this reason we will report only the random effects probit model results in subsequent
tables.
A significant negative interaction between sequential complementarity and upstreamness is present
throughout all columns of Table 3. This lends support to the Antràs and Chor’s (2013) prediction
inherited by our model that the likelihood of integration decreases when moving upstream along the
production chain for sequential complements, and downstream for sequential substitutes.
In line with our model, there are also significant differences between complements and substitutes
as regards the impact of IPR quality and upstreamness. This is revealed by the significant interaction
of lnIPR with the dummy variable for complements d compl on the one hand, and with both d compl
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and upstreamness Upstr on the other. The interaction of lnIPR with complementarity is negative
and highly significant, suggesting that better IPR institutions, on average, encourage outsourcing
when inputs are complements compared to when they are substitutes.
The positive and significant triple interaction term, in turn, shows that this feature is less
likely at the upstream stages, hence occurring more at the downstream stages of sequential pro-
duction. Finally, integration is more likely when knowledge intensity is increasing with downstream-
ness (d knint downstr = 1). This is so for both complements and substitutes as indicated by the
insignificant interaction term between the dummies d knint downstr and d compl.
5.2.2 Split-sample results
Table 4 reports the results for specification (II), in which the sample is split into sequential com-
plements and substitutes. This allows us to see more directly that the coefficients associated with
IPR quality are only relevant in the case of complements. This is consistent with the prediction of
Proposition 6 that the impact of IPR quality should be weaker for substitutes.
The significantly negative coefficient of lnIPR in columns (1-3) again suggests that IPR qual-
ity tends to reduce a firm’s propensity to integrate, especially for relatively downstream stages, as
denoted by the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction between lnIPR and Upstr. As
we will see below for the double-split sample, this finding can also be interpreted as the impact of
IPR quality being stronger for more knowledge-intensive inputs. Recall first that, with sequential
complementarity, outsourcing (integration) takes place upstream (downstream). When the down-
stream side of production is relatively more knowledge intensive, better IPR quality leads to more
outsourcing downstream; when instead the upstream side of production is relatively more knowledge
intensive, better IPR quality could even lead to more integration upstream. The results survive the
demanding introduction of country dummies into the random effect probit model in column (3),
with reduced significance of the overall effect of IPR quality, but still a strongly significant associa-
tion with upstreamness, thus highlighting the importance of IPR quality for organizational decisions
when production is sequential.
The impact of upstreamness on integration differs for complements and substitutes, as confirmed
by the Chow test of equality of regression coefficients between the two groups. In particular, in
line with the aggregate sample results, the impact of upstreamness is significantly negative for
complements. Integration is more likely when knowledge intensity is increasing downstream, with
the effect being more robust and of larger magnitude in the case of substitutes.
In columns (7-8) we replace IPR quality with a measure of ‘rule of law’ from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (2015) database as a proxy for overall contract enforcement. The results
clearly show that contract enforcement has the opposite effect with respect to IPR quality on the
integration decision. This is in line with with the property rights model of Antràs and Chor (2013)
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as the impact of better contract enforcement is significantly negative for substitutes and positive
for complements with a significant negative interaction of contract enforcement and upstreamness:
better contract enforcement increases the prevalence of integration over outsourcing. This divergence
suggests that better institutions may have opposite effects on firm organization depending on whether
they improve the protection of tangible or intangible assets. It also shows that our findings in the
previous columns of Table 4 are specific to IPR institutions and cannot be generalized to other
regulatory measures that directly affect contract enforcement.
As for the firm-specific controls, the results in both specifications (I) and (II) indicate that
larger and older firms with higher export propensity are more likely to integrate inputs both for
complements and substitutes.11 Differently, Table 4 shows that capital intensity has opposite impact
on integration for complements and substitutes: positive for former and negative for the latter. On
the other hand, the impact of labor productivity is significantly negative for substitutes and mostly
insignificant or weakly significant for complements. The heterogeneous effects of capital intensity
and labor productivity explain why their estimated impacts are less consistent across the columns
of Table 3, where complements and substitutes are pooled together. Finally, financial leverage has
a negative effect on integration for both complements and substitutes.
5.2.3 Double-split sample zoom in the complements case
We saw in Table 4 that better IPR quality in the source country increases the propensity to outsource
when inputs are sequential complements. However, the positive interaction between IPR quality and
upstreamness conveyed the message that this is not always the case and the effect prominently takes
place downstream. It may also mean that firms would become more inclined toward integration with
improved IPR quality along stages on the upstream part of the value chain.
Our theory predicts that this distinction depends on whether input knowledge intensity is in-
creasing or decreasing as sequential production moves downstream. To investigate this aspect, in
specification (III) we further split the sample accordingly. In particular, we focus on the comple-
ments case as Proposition 6 and its supporting results from Table 4 suggest that cutoff stages are
particularly responsive to IPR quality in that case. We also augment the specification with the
relative knowledge intensity of upstream inputs (rel upst knint) when input knowledge intensity
decreases downstream and, alternatively, with the relative knowledge intensity of downstream in-
puts ((rel upst knint)−1) when input knowledge intensity increases downstream. These additional
variables correspond to parameter ω in Proposition 4 and also capture the rate at which knowledge
intensity is decreasing and increasing with downstreamness respectively.
Table 5 reports the double-split sample results of specification (III) for complements. In Col-
11The only exception appears in column (2) of Table 3, where the effect of export propensity is absorbed by period
averages introduced in the wake of Mundlak (1978), Chamberlain (1984) and Wooldridge (2002).
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umn (1) input knowledge intensity increases downstream (d knint downstr = 1) and this hap-
pens at rate (rel upst knint)−1. In Column (2) input knowledge intensity decreases downstream
(d knint downstr = 0) and this happens at rate (rel upst knint). In line with our theoretical pre-
dictions in Proposition 4, the table shows a significantly positive impact of (rel upst knint)−1 on the
likelihood of integration in the former case, and a significantly negative impact of (rel upst knint)
in the latter case.
As for the impact of IPR quality lnIPR on integration, it remains significantly negative for
complements no matter whether knowledge intensity is increasing or decreasing downstream. How-
ever, the coefficient of the interaction term between lnIPR and Upstr is significant only when input
knowledge intensity decreases downstream. In this case it is positive and the implied indirect effect
of lnIPR through the interaction dominates its negative direct effect for upstream stages. Accord-
ingly, in line with Proposition 4, better IPR quality extends the set of integrated stages towards the
upstream part of the value chain.
To better visualize the impact of lnIPR and help us interpret its interaction with Upstr, Figure
4 graphically represents the estimated marginal effects reported in Table 6 relative to columns (1)
and (2) of Table 5.12 The figure plots the average marginal effects of an increase in IPR quality on
the probability of integration at different stages along the supply chain when knowledge intensity
increases downstream (left panel) or decreases downstream (right panel). In line with our theoretical
predictions, the left panel shows a strong negative impact on the propensity to integrate for inputs
that enter the value chain downstream, while the right panel shows a strong positive impact for
those that enter upstream.
The double-split sample can also be exploited to compare the impact of IPR institutions with
that of more general contracting institutions (rule of law). This is done in column (3) focusing on
the case of sequential complements and knowledge intensity increasing downstream. The column
reports an effect of rule of law that is in stark contrast to that of IPR quality in column (1) as better
contract enforcement increases the propensity to integrate. Figure 5 plots the estimated average
marginal effects of IPR quality versus those of rule of law reported in Table 6, based on columns (1)
and (3) in Table 5 respectively. The former are both stronger and opposite to those of rule of law.
This confirms the insight from specification (I) that better institutions have opposite effects on firm
organization depending on whether they improve the protection of tangible or intangible assets.
5.2.4 Robustness Checks
In this section we report the results of several robustness tests of our findings to alternative variable
definitions and sample restrictions. In doing so, we build on the single-split specification (II) to
12Regression coefficients in probit models cannot be interpreted as simple slopes as in ordinary linear regressions,
but have to be interpreted in terms of Z-scores (i.e. as changes in Z-score for one unit increase in the explanatory
variable).
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consider all available observations and guarantee a sufficient number of observations for the different
sample restrictions.
First, Table 7 reports the results obtained from modifications of specification (II) aimed at
ensuring a vertical-type connection between a firm’s imported inputs and its core export product. In
particular, columns (1) and (2) report the results when we restrict the sample to import transactions
that are classified as intermediates or capital goods according to the Broad Economic Categories
classification; columns (3) and (4) show the results when we use our alternative dependent variable
(d integr IFEXihjt), which conditions the classification of transactions as intra-firm also on the
existence of a firm’s affiliate in the source country declaring intra-firm export activities.
The results in Table 7 confirms those in Table 4: better IPR quality diminishes the propensity
to integrate in relatively downstream stages for complements, while the impact for substitutes is
not statistically significant. Moreover, the differences between complements and substitutes, in line
with theoretical predictions, become more pronounced both with respect to inputs’ upstreamness
and relative knowledge intensity along the value chain. Specifically, the impact of Upstr remains
significantly negative for complements, while it becomes significantly positive for substitutes in
column (2); the interaction between lnIPR and Upstr becomes significantly negative in column
(2); and the impact of d knint downstr turns insignificant for complements in column (3), while
remaining highly significant and positive for substitutes.
Second, Table 8 presents the results obtained using two alternative indicators of sequential com-
plements/substitutes described in Section 4.2. In particular, columns (1)-(4) use the indicator
d complrho×alpha(ind.) based on the core product’s demand elasticity rho (as a proxy for ρ) and
the industry average of the Herfindahl index (as a proxy for (inverse) α); columns (5-8) use in-
stead the dummy d complrho−alpha(elast.) based on the difference between rho and another proxy
for α based on the demand elasticity of imported intermediate and capital goods. Due to signifi-
cant ‘frailty’ confirmed by the likelihood-ratio test, we continue to rely on a random effects probit
estimator, thereby controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at detailed firm-country-product level.
The results in Table 8 show that our previous findings reported in Table 4 are robust to the
alternative ways of disentangling complements from substitutes. In the case of complements, in all
columns the impact of better IPR quality is again significantly negative. Moreover, the interaction
term of IPR quality with upstreamness is still positive and even more significant than before. Finally,
the estimates also remain positive for the coefficient on the dummy d knint downstr, which indicates
when knowledge intensive inputs are located more downstream along the value chain. On the other
hand, no significant effect of IPR quality is detected in the case of substitutes.
Further robustness checks can be found in Appendix B where, for both complements and sub-
stitutes, we focus on the case of higher relative knowledge transmission upstream as this case is
more readily comparable with the case of higher degree of upstream contractibility of tangible in-
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vestments. After presenting our baseline results for specification (III), we extend the analysis to
alternative measures of sequential complements/substitutes. We then look at how our results vary
across firms that differ in their reliance on inputs sourced by a single country. Finally, we control
for additional source country institutional variables that could potentially influence our results in
different parts of the value chain. Once more, our conclusions in Section 5.2.2 are confirmed.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced intangible assets in a property rights model of sequential supply chains. In
the resulting model firms transmit knowledge to their suppliers to facilitate inputs’ customization,
but they must protect the transmitted intangibles to avoid knowledge dissipation. Protection is
costly and depends on both inputs’ knowledge intensity and the quality of institutions protecting
intellectual property rights (IPR) in suppliers’ locations.
Our model predicts that, when inputs’ knowledge intensity increases (decreases) downstream and
suppliers’ investments are complements, the probability of integrating a randomly selected input is
decreasing (increasing) in IPR quality and increasing (decreasing) in the relative knowledge intensity
of downstream inputs. It yields opposite but weaker predictions when suppliers’ investments are
substitutes.
Through the analysis of comprehensive trade and FDI data covering the population of Slovenian
firms from 2007 to 2010 we have found evidence in support of our theoretical predictions. Moreover,
as also predicted by the model, we have shown that better overall contract enforcement (‘rule of law’)
has the opposite impact of better IPR quality. This divergence suggests that better institutions may
have very different effects on firm organization depending on whether they improve the protection
of tangible or intangible assets. It also shows that our findings are specific to IPR institutions and
cannot be generalized to other regulatory measures that affect contract enforcement.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Appendix
A1. Heterogeneous cost of protection of knowledge transmission (simple
model)
In this Appendix, we build on the simple model of supply chain outlined in Section 2, where pro-
duction consists of two stages only: a final stage performed by the firm, and a single intermediate
stage of production performed by a supplier.
In subsection 2.1 we have introduced the problem of costly knowledge transmission, assuming
that the firm faces a given cost of protecting any bit of knowledge transmitted to its supplier,
unconditional from its organizational choice. One might argue that this cost may vary with the
organizational mode, depending on whether the supplier is integrated within the firm boundaries or
it operates as a stand-alone entity. We can accordingly adapt specification (3) as follows
κ(ω, λ) = κoωδ
λ,
where κo = {κV , κO} reflects differences in the cost (or difficulty) of protecting knowledge trans-
mission under different organizational modes, βo = {βV , βO}. The firm profit, in turn, becomes
πF = βor(x)− κ(κo, ω, λ).
Since the supplier’s profit-maximizing level of investment in (5) is unaffected by this change, the
firm problem can be formulated as
max
βo,ϕ









s.t. βo ∈ {βV , βO}; δ > 0,
where co = {cV , cO} > 0 is the marginal cost of input customization, that we also allow to vary with
the organizational form.
The program is solved in two steps. First, we maximize πF with respect to δ, so as to obtain
δ+(βo), i.e. the optimal amount of protected knowledge to transmit for a given organizational mode.



















































which is strictly positive for λ > ρ/(1 − ρ), the same restriction on parameters that applies to the
baseline model with symmetric costs of knowledge protection, κV = κO = 1 (see Subsection 2.1).
What changes with respect to the baseline model in Section 2 is that, here, independence between
the parallel decisions on organization and knowledge transmission does not hold anymore. This is
evident from (A2), particularly from the ratio between square brackets, which captures the organi-
zational trade-offs: all else being equal, firm profit is higher for the organizational mode featuring
(i) lower marginal cost of input provision co, (ii) lower cost κo of protecting the transmitted amount
of knowledge and, finally, (iii) firm bargaining weight closer to the relaxed optimum (still β+o = 1−ρ
as in the baseline two-stage model).
Our restriction on the size of λ implies that firm profit in (A2) is negatively related to κo,
hence the profit is lower for the organizational mode under which knowledge transmission is more
costly to protect. Moreover, the gap in profits originating from the cost differential is larger, the more
knowledge-intensive the input (the larger ω), with the organizational choice that becomes accordingly





























ρ−λ(1−ρ) > 0 .
Traditional assumptions are that, due to gains from specialization, co is smaller under outsourcing
(i.e. cO < cV ), while κo is larger (i.e. κO > κV ) as knowledge dissipation is more likely when
knowledge has to be transmitted outside the firm boundaries, rendering the protection of proprietary
technology a more tedious (and costly) task. Accordingly, we treat both co and κo as functions of
βo, assuming co = (βo)
γ
and κo = (1− βo)η, where both γ and η take value in the interval (0, 1).


















The first-order condition of the relaxed version of the firm problem (where β can take any value in







βo = 0 .
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The optimal share of ownership then evaluates to
β+o =
λ (1− (1 + γ) ρ)
λ(1− γρ)− ηρ
. (A3)
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λ(1− γρ)− ηρ
)1− γρ1−ρ (






is a bundling parameter. From (A4) we note that the firm’s desired amount of transmitted knowledge
is inversely related with the knowledge intensity of the input procured from the suppler, in tune with
the evidence that stems from (7) in the baseline version of the two-stage model.
The presence of cost heterogeneity between integration and outsourcing reveals a static trade-off
faced by the firm regarding its organizational decision. When the input involves no firm-specific
knowledge (or little), the property rights model is fully at play, prompting the use of outsourcing to
create investment incentives by offering a larger share of the surplus to the input supplier. When the
input is instead knowledge-intensive, low optimal investment makes the value of supplier’s efforts
prone to dissipation, thereby reducing supplier returns and incentives for adequate investment in
input customization. Finally, when protecting knowledge transmission is costlier under outsourcing,
the differential cost of protection gets larger for more knowledge-intensive inputs. This makes the firm
even more vulnerable to rent dissipation whenever outsourcing, hence the latter will represent a viable
option only if (i) IPR institutions in the supplier’s location are strong enough to compensate the extra
costs of protecting knowledge transmission associated with outsourcing, and/or (ii) specialization
gains from outsourcing are sufficiently large. We highlight this result as:
Lemma 7 (A.1) When protecting knowledge transmission is costlier under outsourcing, higher
knowledge intensity of the input disproportionately reduces knowledge transmission (with increased
exposure to the risk of dissipation and rent destruction) by more under outsourcing, thereby increas-
ing the firm’s propensity towards vertical integration.
A2. Notation in eq. (19)
We report here the analytical expressions of the bundling parameter Γ(βV , βO) appearing in Sub-
section 3.2.2, and more precisely in (19). As explained in the main text, in the case of sequential
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complements Γ(βV , βO) evaluates to
ΓC(βV , βO) ≡ ΛC(1− βO)
ρ
1−ρ











with ΛC ≡ (HC)
ρ(1−α)
α(1−ρ) , where HC corresponds to the expression in (17).
In turn, in the case of sequential substitutes Γ(βV , βO) evaluates to
ΓS(βV , βO) ≡ ΛS(1− βV )
ρ
1−ρ











with ΛS ≡ (HS)
ρ(1−α)
α(1−ρ) , where HS corresponds to the expression in (18).
It can be easily proved that ΓC(βV , βO) = ΓS(βO, βV ) as claimed in Subsection 3.2.2.
A3. Sequential production model: a special case
In Subsection 3.3, two examples are given for concreteness when considering how IPR quality shapes
the organization of a sequential supply chain in which knowledge intensity is a monotonic function
of z. In particular we assume the specific functional forms ω(s) = eωs and ω(s) = eω(1−s) for the
cases where knowledge intensity of the inputs used in production respectively rises and falls with
downstreamness.
In this Appendix, we explicit solve the model for one of these two examples, namely the former.
From here onwards, we therefore assume ω(z) = eωz, where ω > 0 is the constant rate at which
knowledge intensity rises as production moves one stage further along the value chain. Consistently,
we interpret ω as a measure of the relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs with respect
to upstream ones. The model is solved starting from (19) and proceeding in two steps as before.









where z′ ∈ [0, 1] denotes a generic stage of production located upstream of z (i.e., z > z′), while
λ > α/(1 − α) is a necessary restriction on parameters for the second-order condition to also hold
in the case of complements.
Based on (A5), the higher the knowledge intensity of downstream stages relative to upstream
ones (higher ω(z)/ω(z′)), the lower the knowledge transmission downstream (smaller δ(z)/δ(z′)).
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′), with µ ≡ ω
λ− α1−α
,
implying that the optimal choice of δ(z) decreases with z, i.e. with downstreamness, given δ(z) >
(<)δ(z′) for z < (>)z′.
To simplify the analysis, we can pick a suitable normalization of the marginal cost of input
provision c, such that the optimally-chosen amount of transmitted knowledge at stage z boils down

















Taking the first-order condition for the maximization of πF with respect to ϕ(z), then integrating,

















































from which a suitable normalization for c is easily derived such that the optimal policy function of
the firm is indeed δ(z) = e−µz. Note that the rate at which the optimal amount of transmitted
knowledge (exponentially) decreases along the value chain, namely µ, is a bundling parameter which
compounds both technological variables (ω and α) and institutional ones (λ).
Organizational choices. We can now derive the optimal share of ownership for any stage z.





















































with u(z) = υ′(z) = [e−µz(1− β(z))]
α
1−α .



















= 0 , (A7)
with υ = υ(z), u = u(z) = υ′, and u′ = υ′′. Out of the three admissible solutions for (A7), only one











The optimal share of ownership for each stage z can be retrieved by solving the second-order
differential equation implied by (A8), in light of the transversality condition eµ υ′(1)
1−α
α = α, and
the initial condition υ(0) = 0.
The solution that we obtain is








which can be proved to satisfy a sufficient condition for the maximum and thus qualifies as the
solution of the firm problem in its relaxed version, where β(z) is not restricted to either βV or βO
but can be chosen from the whole set of piece-wise continuously differentiable real-valued functions.
The policy function β∗(z) in (A9) does not violate the constraint 0 ≤ β(z) ≤ 1, for all ρ ∈ (0, 1)
and α ∈ (0, 1) such that ρ < α. Hence, in the case of substitutes, the function above is admitted
as the solution to the unconstrained problem, which necessarily corresponds to the one which yields
the maximum for the constrained version of the same problem, where restriction β(z) ∈ {βV , βO}
applies.
If ρ > α holds, the optimal share β∗(z) instead violates the constraint at least for some values
of z ∈ [0, 1]. In the case of complements, the solution to program (A6) must therefore be obtained
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s.t. 0 < u(z) e
α
1−αµz < 1
υ(0) = 0 (initial condition).
The associated Hamiltonian function








α(1−ρ) + ` u+ ϑ (1− e
α
1−αµz u)
implies the costate equation
`′ = −∂H
∂υ












Solving the first-order condition (∂H/∂u = 0) for ` and then taking the total derivative, a second




















+ F (z, ϑ′, ϑ) = 0,
which coincides with (A8) insofar as the constraint u ≤ 1 (i.e. β(z) ≥ 0) does not bind, implying
ϑ′ = ϑ = 0.
Nevertheless, for ρ > α, the solution in (A9) is renown to violate the above constraint, which
is proved to happen in the neighborhood of z = 0, when υ(z) gets sufficiently small. This implies
ϑ > 0. If the constraint binds at some point ẑ ∈ (0, 1), then it necessarily binds (i.e. θ > 0)
for any z < ẑ. As a result, we pose β(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [0, ẑ], from which the boundary condition
e
α
1−αµẑ υ′(ẑ) = 1 is easily derived. Then, we look for a solution of the first-order differential equation
that solves (A11) only limited to z > ẑ. In our search, we take advantage of two pieces of additional
information: the first is the transversality condition (eµυ′(1)
1−α
α = α), while the second is the fact














. After a few manipulations, we pin down stage ẑ


















The policy function that applies to all z > ẑ can be finally proved to be













with χ ≡ (1− ρ)(1− α





Hence, the solution to the constrained version of the firms’ problem, which solves the relaxed program
















where the double asterisk differentiates the solution above from the one relative to the unconstrained
problem, i.e. β∗(z) in (A9).
In Figure 6, the policy function β∗∗(z) in (A13), which solves the constrained problem in (A10)
for the case of complements (ρ > α), is represented with a solid line, upward-sloping for all z > ẑ.
It is plotted together with the solution to the unconstrained problem in (A9) for the cases where
ρ > α (dotted line) and ρ < α (solid line, downward-sloping). As in Antràs and Chor (2013), the
optimal share of ownership turns out to be decreasing with z in the case of substitutes (ρ < α) and
increasing for complements (ρ > α). In this second case (complements), at all stages z > ẑ the share
is higher in the unconstrained problem than in the constrained one: β∗(z) > β∗∗(z). Moreover,
when upstream suppliers cannot be incentivized by being offered a payoff exceeding their marginal
contribution (as it would be optimal in the lack of the restriction 0 < β(z) < 1), then the firm
optimally offers “their full marginal contribution to a larger measure of suppliers, and a higher share
of their marginal contribution to the remaining suppliers”(Antràs and Chor, 2013).
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Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis
To test the sensitivity of our results to different specifications, we first replicate the double-split
sample results obtained in column (1) of Table 5 for both complements and substitutes, adding
here industry fixed effects. To simplify the comparison and better grasp the intuition behind our
results, we take a subsample of industries in which relatively more knowledge transmission takes
place upstream. Results are depicted in Table 9.
We observe a significantly negative impact of the ratio rel upst knintk on the likelihood of
vertical integration in the case of complements. This indicates that, at least for complements, when
knowledge intensity of inputs increases downstream, the probability of integration is increasing in
the relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs. Recall that here the sign of rel upst knintk
is negative since this is an inverse measure of relative knowledge intensity of the downstream stages.
This finding supports Proposition 4. On the other hand, the impact of relative knowledge intensity
of downstream inputs on integration of a certain input within the firm boundary is negative for
substitutes (in line with Proposition 5) yet not significant, which conforms with Proposition 6.
As regard to the impact of IPR institutions on our dependent variable, it remains significantly
negative for complements also when limiting the sample to those industries where knowledge intensity
is increasing with downstreamness (in line with Proposition 4). Again, a negative impact on the
likelihood of integration tends to be most pronounced for relatively downstream stages, as denoted by
the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction between lnIPR and Upstr. As downstream
stages are the knowledge intensive ones in the sample, this can also be interpreted as the impact
of IPR quality being stronger for more knowledge-intensive inputs. The optimal organizational
choice is far less responsive to the quality of IPR institutions in the sourcing partner-country when
considering substitutes.
Next, we extend our results to the alternative methods of categorizing complements versus substi-
tutes. Table 10 illustrates the results. In columns (1)-(4) we consider both rho (the estimated import
demand elasticity) and industry averages of the Herfindahl index, thereby distinguishing between
complements and substitutes based on d complrho×alpha (ind.). In columns (5)-(8), the specifications
are based on the difference between rho and the measure alpha (elast.) obtained from estimated
demand elasticities of the intermediate and capital goods imported: the distinction therefore hinges
on d complrho−alpha (elast.).
The results on the effect of IPR institutions on the propensity towards integration are robust to
the baseline specification with the rho measure and in line with Propositions 4 and 5. We can instead
observe a change as regard to the effect of relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs. The
impact of the ratio rel upst knintk on the likelihood of vertical integration shifts from significant
to insignificant in the case of complements, while it becomes significantly positive in the case of
substitutes, as stated in Proposition 5. In other words, provided that input knowledge intensity
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increases with downstreamness and supplier investments are sequential substitutes, the probability
of integration is decreasing in the relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs.
Despite this switch in the level of significance, under all alternatives measures of complemen-
tarity/substitutability, the response of our dependent variable to relative knowledge intensity of
downstream inputs significantly differs between complements and substitutes, in a manner that does
not contradict and even reinforces our theoretical predictions. An additional result obtained empiri-
cally is that the strength of IPR institutions is more relevant when inputs are complements, whereas
knowledge intensity plays a larger role for organizational decisions when inputs are substitutes.
The vast majority of firms in our sample (and basically all firms reporting outward FDIs) source
their inputs from more than one partner country; therefore, we are not able to replicate exactly the
scope of the one-partner country model with our empirical setting. Instead, we test the robustness of
our results by gradually restricting the baseline database to firms which import a certain proportion
of their inputs from a single country.
We start with a sub-sample of firms with at least 10% share of inputs being sourced from one-
county (columns (1) and (2) in Table 11), and further increase the threshold concentration level to
20% and 30% of inputs obtained from a single country in columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), respectively.
The results in terms of the impact of relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs and of IPR
enforcement on the integration decision (and other regressors) are very stable and fully robust when
pushing the threshold from 10% to 20% and further to a 30% share within a single (primary) source
country. The magnitude of coefficients for relative knowledge intensity of downstream inputs even
slightly increases and becomes more significant with higher thresholds.
Finally, we control for the possibility that the interaction term lnIPR ∗ Upstr may pick up
the effect of upstreamness with other time-varying effects in the partner country, since there is
limited variation in the quality of IPR institutions over time. We therefore adjust the empirical
model specification by including additional partner-country institutional variables that are likely
to be correlated with lnIPR, i.e., rule of law, government effectiveness, and control of corruption
obtained from Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015). We then interact upstreamness with these
institutional variables simultaneously. Results presented in Table 12 are obtained with the rho-
based categorization of complements and substitutes and show that the coefficient on lnIPR∗Upstr
remains significantly positive after adding other institutional variables and their interactions with
upstreamness. The impact of other regressors is fully robust to the baseline results.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: The GVC participation index, Slovenia 2011 (% share in total gross exports).
Developing Developed
Slovenia countries countries
Total GVC participation 58.7 48.6 48.0
Forward participation 22.6 23.1 24.2
Backward participation 36.1 25.5 23.8
Source: WTO.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Pooled Complements Complements Substitutes Substitutes
sample with with with with
IP intensity IP intensity IP intensity IP intensity
downstream1 upstream2 downstream3 upstream4
mean mean mean mean mean
(std dev.) (std dev.) (std dev.) (std dev.) (std dev.)
d OutFDI 0.184 0.165 0.218 0.197 0.161
(0.388) (0.371) (0.413) (0.398) (0.367)
d OutFDI bilateral 0.031 0.026 0.042 0.040 0.015
(0.173) (0.159) (0.201) (0.197) (0.120)
d integr 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0007 0.00003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026) (0.006)
d integr IFEX 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.00001
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.003)
Upstreamness 2.523 2.523 2.503 2.531 2.530
(1.072) (1.033) (1.115) (1.045) (1.105)
IMP demand elasticity (abs.) 1.167 1.725 1.357 0.892 0.848
(2.391) (4.707) (1.406) (0.167) (0.219)
Inputs’ demand elasticity 1.150 1.185 1.196 1.108 1.134
(0.903) (0.817) (0.647) (1.172) (0.748)
Industry Herfindahl index (H̄jt) 0.718 0.720 0.694 0.737 0.711
(0.082) (0.086) (0.095) (0.066) (0.079)
rel upst knintk 0.994 0.951 1.054 0.937 1.058
(0.072) (0.045) (0.034) (0.056) (0.035)
IPR index 4.525 4.530 4.515 4.534 4.517
(0.241) (0.221) (0.253) (0.234) (0.258)
Rule of law index 1.300 1.320 1.273 1.350 1.241
(0.649) (0.643) (0.660) (0.618) (0.678)
Age 16.808 16.721 16.767 17.029 16.647
(8.011) (7.985) (8.363) (8.112) (7.620)
Employment 361.775 136.495 316.481 435.193 512.303
(1,336.96) (306.311) (743.912) (1,466.0) (1,939.6)
Ex propensity 0.313 0.297 0.290 0.354 0.295
(0.336) (0.331) (0.326) (0.349) (0.329)
Kintensity 86,064.2 72,283.4 64,065.8 91,761.8 108,545.4
(576,600) (177,074) (208,802) (488,467) (971,779)
Lproductivity 46,252.9 43,827.6 37,954.3 56,949.5 41,666.5
(112,858) (45,776.8) (47,796.3) (184,371.5) (64,002.0)
Debt assets ratio 0.610 0.608 0.638 0.576 0.631
(0.242) (0.241) (0,245) (0.244) (0.233)
No of observations 791,911 185,156 155,278 249,187 202,290
Note: Labour productivity (L productivity) and capital intensity (K intensity) are expressed in EUR.
[1] d comp = 1 & d knint downstr =1; [2] d comp = 1 & d knint downstr = 0
[3] d comp = 0 & d knint downstr = 1 ; [4] d comp = 0 & d knint downstr = 0
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Table 3: Probit and random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level for
pooled sample/triple interaction specification, rho
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit RE Probit RE probit
Chamberlain
-Mundlak
d comp 12.11** 12.44** 30.51*** 35.41***
1 (5.245) (5.309) (10.67) (11.41)
lnIPR 0.478 0.372 -3.085 0.604
(2.336) (2.431) (5.435) (9.320)
d comp ∗ lnIPR -7.673** -7.888** -19.00*** -22.54***
1 (3.528) (3.568) (7.166) (7.706)
Upstr 0.490 0.541 -0.687 -0.388
(1.068) (1.050) (3.003) (4.568)
d comp ∗ Upstr -6.164* -6.347* -13.13** -16.55**
1 (3.228) (3.297) (6.163) (6.826)
lnIPR ∗ Upstr -0.500 -0.533 0.0520 -0.348
(0.786) (0.773) (2.050) (3.094)
d comp ∗ lnIPR ∗ Upstr 4.029* 4.147* 8.530** 10.98**
1 (2.147) (2.191) (4.116) (4.564)
d knint downstr 0.791*** 0.803*** 3.023*** 2.474***
1 (0.267) (0.271) (0.772) (0.650)
d knint downstr ∗ d comp -0.454 -0.449 -1.038 -1.036
1 1 (0.289) (0.296) (0.938) (0.852)
lnSize(-1) 0.104 0.338 0.424*** 0.569***
(0.0641) (0.246) (0.137) (0.130)
Age 0.0397*** 0.0409*** 0.215*** 0.183***
(0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0278) (0.0254)
Ex prop(-1) 1.369*** -0.373 5.537*** 4.696***
(0.358) (1.155) (0.748) (0.787)
ln Kintensity(-1) 0.159 0.466* 0.231 0.618***
(0.179) (0.269) (0.195) (0.203)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -0.289** -0.307** -1.051*** -1.018***
(0.116) (0.134) (0.313) (0.314)
Debt assets(-1) -0.847** -0.886 -0.472 -1.985**
(0.427) (0.568) (0.704) (0.792)
Constant -5.407 -5.452 -12.54 -23.98
(3.485) (3.663) (8.220) (14.61)
Country dummies yes yes no yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes no yes
Firm-level means no yes no no
Log (pse.)likelihood -1424.0673 -1416.8795 -988.77034 -878.37635
Wald test chi2(42)= chi2(47)= chi2(21)= chi2(42)=
3802.43*** 4881.52*** 297.96*** 336.83***
Wald test for heteroscedasticity (H0: lnsigma2=0)
lnsigma2 0.016 0.014
lempllag (0.053) (0.058) / /
chi2(1) 0.09 0.06
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
/ / 1458.58*** 1091.38***
Observations 615,847 611,495 791,911 615,847
No. of firm market product 445,249 347,470
Note: Robust Std. Err. in round brackets, adjusted for firm clusters in (heteroskedastic) probit models;
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level, rho
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE probit RE probit RE probit RE probit RE probit RE probit RE probit RE probit
d integr d integr d integr d integr d integr d integr d integr d integr
Comp Comp Comp Subst Subst Subst Comp Subst
lnIPR -15.519*** -38.072*** -23.50* -1.264 -2.847 -24.21
(2.344) (6.285) (13.37) (3.679) (8.869) (19.11)
Upstr -20.879*** -21.90*** -2.073 -3.605 -0.128 -1.129***
(6.657) (6.833) (4.763) (5.810) (0.162) (0.217)
lnIPR ∗ Upstr 12.851*** 13.70*** 0.866 1.699
(4.413) (4.511) (3.241) (3.891)
wgi rule law 5.379*** -6.386***
(1.992) (1.925)
upst ∗ wgi rule law -0.590*** 0.186
(0.200) (0.238)
d knint downstr 0.878 2.085** 1.401** 3.028** 2.577*** 3.122*** 1.472*** 3.941***
(0.663) (0.891) (0.639) (1.193) (0.782) (0.784) (0.429) (0.660)
lnSize(-1) 1.114*** 1.863*** 1.329*** 1.012*** 0.899*** 0.992*** 0.873*** 0.934***
(0.353) (0.422) (0.320) (0.228) (0.169) (0.188) (0.168) (0.139)
Age 0.243*** 0.202*** 0.176*** 0.210*** 0.174*** 0.177*** 0.0831*** 0.155***
(0.057) (0.069) (0.0523) (0.052) (0.037) (0.0403) (0.0259) (0.0269)
Ex prop(-1) 6.583*** 9.232*** 6.036*** 3.264*** 2.925*** 3.217*** 6.731*** 3.650***
(1.196) (1.856) (1.395) (1.157) (1.040) (1.194) (0.669) (0.753)
ln Kintensity(-1) 1.279*** 2.693*** 2.015*** -0.856*** -0.713*** -0.628* 1.357*** -0.390
(0.406) (0.586) (0.370) (0.3032) (0.277) (0.335) (0.240) (0.240)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -0.785 -1.365* -1.027* -1.420*** -1.103** -1.115** -0.132 -1.509***
(0.615) (0.774) (0.612) (0.504) (0.466) (0.517) (0.299) (0.359)
Debt assets(-1) -5.702*** -7.327*** -5.393*** -4.431*** -2.863** -3.042** -2.877*** -2.130**
(1.894) (2.590) (1.676) (1.677) (1.300) (1.430) (0.911) (0.865)
lnDist 0.021 0.072 -0.143 -0.125
(0.354) (0.433) (0.282) (0.283)
lnGDP 0.567* 0.717* -0.389** -0.447**
(0.302) (0.378) (0.191) (0.194)
lnGDPpc -0.309 -1.174* -0.975* -1.038*
(0.549) (0.697) (0.539) (0.562)
Constant -25.118*** -0.451 -0.0927 7.474 14.651 22.23 -43.96*** -7.668
(9.454) (17.799) (21.44) (7.488) (12.457) (30.21) (5.445) (5.288)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies no no yes no no yes yes yes
Log likelihood -395.2353 -375.8171 -335.4060 -513.4540 -509.6724 -445.5180 -887.1148 -891.4427
Wald test chi2(19)= chi2(21)= chi2(33)= chi2(18)= chi2(20)= chi2(29)= chi2(40)= chi2(34)=
199.31*** 231.80*** 141.44*** 271.77*** 340.92*** 379.20*** 324.0*** 425.32***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
368.95*** 311.41 246.84*** 915.31*** 872.81*** 692.60*** 745.82*** 1303.24***
Observations 308,518 308,518 246,902 390,751 390,751 312,789 277,561 362,193
No. of firm market prod 197,751 197,751 155,372 243,737 243,737 192,766 175,414 221,836
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level for sequential
complements (i.e., double-split subsample), rho
(1) (2) (3)
RE probit RE probit RE probit
Comp Comp Comp
d knint downstr=1 d knint downstr=0 d knint downstr=1









lnIPR ∗ Upstr 6.831 62.81***
(4.508) (20.71)
wgi rule law 1.434**
(0.730)
upst ∗ wgi rule law -0.972***
(0.290)
lnSize(-1) 2.138*** 7.724** 1.608***
(0.589) (3.121) (0.260)
Age 0.229** 0.211 0.0424
(0.0909) (0.144) (0.0400)
Ex prop(-1) 8.881*** 32.32*** 6.946***
(1.591) (11.81) (0.840)
ln Kintensity(-1) 2.829*** 4.924*** 2.185***
(0.696) (1.860) (0.392)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -3.071*** 4.628** -0.652
(1.083) (2.256) (0.558)
Debt assets(-1) -11.57*** 1.303 -5.183***
(3.266) (6.132) (1.477)
lnDist 0.154 1.242** -1.959***
(0.410) (0.548) (0.298)
lnGDPpc -0.661 -2.174** -3.803***
(0.836) (1.028) (0.662)
Constant -18.90 68.20 -14.86
(19.17) (60.47) (10.80)
Time dummies yes yes yes
Log likelihood -280.249 -77.091049 -552.01198
Wald test chi2(15)= chi2(15)= chi2(15)=
93.73*** 79.25*** 251.15***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
201.70*** 92.79*** 497.89***
Observations 185,156 155,278 192,940
No. of firm market prod 123,964 102,680 129,438
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Marginal effect of IPR and rule of law, rho
(1) (2) (3)
IPR IPR Rule of Law
Comp Comp Comp
d knint downstr=1 d knint downstr=0 d knint downstr=1
Upstr=1 -0.0044*** -0.0070*** 0.0002
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0003)
Upstr=2 -0.0013** 0.0010* -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002)
Upstr=3 -0.0002 0.0025*** -0.0003**
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0001)
Upstr=4 0.0001 0.0045 -0.0005***
(0.0004) (0.0069) (0.0002)
Upstr=5 0.0002 0.0129** -0.0006***
(0.0004) (0.0059) (0.0002)
Upstr=6 0.0002 0.0103 -0.0007**
(0.0003) (0.0163) (0.0003)
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level on subsample of
intermediate and capital goods and with intra-firm corrected dependent variable, rho
(1) (2) (3) (4)
d integr d integr d integr IFEX d integr IFEX
intermediate & intermediate & full sample full sample
capital goods capital goods
Comp Subst Comp Subst
lnIPR -43.10*** 8.015 -33.52*** -0.383
(6.291) (6.494) (6.321) (6.963)
Upstr -24.86*** 10.86*** -17.21** -0.529
(7.097) (3.357) (6.734) (4.004)
lnIPR ∗ Upstr 15.59*** -8.576*** 10.51** 0.0834
(4.695) (2.375) (4.446) (2.731)
d knint downstr 1.365* 3.983*** -0.303 3.841***
(0.795) (1.321) (0.800) (1.147)
lnSize(-1) 1.702*** 0.661** 1.315*** 1.263***
(0.471) (0.261) (0.405) (0.234)
Age 0.186*** 0.320*** 0.248*** 0.185***
(0.0632) (0.0661) (0.0745) (0.0674)
Ex prop(-1) 9.323*** 9.572*** 7.093*** 2.598**
(2.150) (2.698) (2.451) (1.220)
ln Kintensity(-1) 2.790*** -1.138** 2.691*** -1.153***
(0.487) (0.474) (0.662) (0.339)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -1.213 -1.752** -1.303* -1.576***
(0.744) (0.861) (0.772) (0.562)
Debt assets(-1) -6.258*** -3.213 -3.802* -4.153**
(2.241) (2.273) (2.033) (1.967)
lnDist 0.0123 -0.642 -0.226 -0.0433
(0.440) (0.527) (0.418) (0.277)
lnGDP 0.881** 0.0119 1.350*** -0.532***
(0.364) (0.303) (0.470) (0.195)
lnGDPpc -1.039 -1.764** -0.575 -0.626
(0.654) (0.896) (0.699) (0.544)
Constant 1.200 -7.079 -22.06 12.34
(15.86) (15.06) (17.08) (12.16)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -354.6491 -359.3736 -230.43421 -393.6205
Wald test chi2(20)= chi2(19)= chi2(18)= chi2(20)=
271.16*** 140.90*** 113.05*** 192.00***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
300.22*** 751.71*** 216.87*** 725.37***
Observations 218,495 246,591 208,942 390,751
No. of firm market prod 141,696 154,273 137,891 243,737
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 8: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level, alternative combined
rho× alpha (ind.) and rho− alpha (elast.) measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rho × alpha rho × alpha rho × alpha rho × alpha rho-alpha rho-alpha rho-alpha rho-alpha
(ind.) (ind.) (ind.) (ind.) (elast.) (elast.) (elast.) (elast.)
Comp Comp Subst Subst Comp Comp Subst Subst
lnIPR -6.967*** -14.966*** -2.781 -1.904 -8.413*** -16.557*** -1.391 -2.415
(1.361) (2.808) (3.038) (5.118) (1.562) (3.209) (3.325) (5.447)
Upstr -7.811*** -0.220 -8.446*** -1.679
(2.348) (3.149) (2.493) (3.443)
lnIPR ∗ Upstr 4.863*** -0.699 5.287*** 0.589
(1.580) (2.142) (1.684) (2.333)
d knint downstr 0.740** 1.099** 1.427*** 1.536*** 1.368*** 1.786*** 2.221*** 2.332***
(0.369) (0.442) (0.459) (0.539) (0.398) (0.480) (0.576) (0.572)
lnSize(-1) 0.100 0.186* 0.565*** 0.688*** 0.171 0.298** 0.358*** 0.486***
(0.088) (0.103) (0.165) (0.207) (0.118) (0.137) (0.110) (0.123)
Age 0.202*** 0.218*** 0.044*** 0.048** 0.233*** 0.216*** 0.147*** 0.142***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.021) (0.025) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028)
Ex prop(-1) 5.469*** 5.967*** 1.598** 1.284* 6.089*** 6.382*** 3.912*** 3.865***
(1.018) (1.126) (0.648) (0.702) (1.285) (1.357) (0.839) (0.904)
ln Kintensity(-1) 0.490*** 0.621*** 0.018 0.091 0.440** 0.586*** 0.516** 0.563**
(0.183) (0.209) (0.233) (0.265) (0.189) (0.209) (0.234) (0.246)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -0.730** -0.884** -0.552* -0.574 -0.681* -0.828** -1.290*** -1.336***
(0.341) (0.393) (0.313) (0.355) (0.358) (0.368) (0.439) (0.437)
Debt assets(-1) -2.301*** -2.793*** -0.202 -0.268 -1.775** -2.113** -4.143*** -4.658***
(0.756) (0.833) (0.812) (0.919) (0.873) (0.943) (0.937) (1.006)
lnDist 0.008 0.062 -0.446 -0.537 -0.118 -0.101 0.036 0.060
(0.153) (0.174) (0.365) (0.391) (0.192) (0.205) (0.217) (0.231)
lnGDP -0.045 -0.125 0.205 0.265 -0.066 -0.161 -0.218 -0.249
(0.112) (0.124) (0.222) (0.236) (0.131) (0.136) (0.161) (0.167)
lnGDPpc -0.317 -0.464 -1.126** -1.092* -0.456 -0.692** -0.679* -0.643
(0.256) (0.314) (0.560) (0.581) (0.317) (0.341) (0.404) (0.420)
Constant -2.085 12.353* 0.641 -0.809 -1.055 16.923** -2.112 0.771
(4.316) (6.657) (6.008) (8.332) (4.934) (7.018) (5.741) (9.046)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -781.7466 -758.7575 -216.9733 -203.2858 -639.0314 -623.4490 -553.2302 -541.8337
Wald test chi2(18)= chi2(20)= chi2(19)= chi2(21)= chi2(18)= chi2(20)= chi2(18)= chi2(20)=
193.35*** 186.66*** 46.03*** 32.58*** 177.15*** 138.54*** 161.41*** 147.99***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
1102.3*** 1061.28 139.98*** 110.18*** 581.49*** 525.49 288.90*** 267.81***
Observations 336,484 336,484 371,962 371,962 265,050 265,050 396,920 396,920
No. of
firm market prod 216,899 216,899 239,516 239,516 176,958 176,958 255,152 255,152
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 9: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level for input knowledge
intensity downstream (i.e., double-split subsample), rho
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE probit RE probit RE probit RE probit
Comp Comp Subst Subst
rel upst knintk -14.724** -19.229* 9.028 2.656
(6.715) (10.265) (6.682) (5.878)
lnIPR -12.718*** -24.956*** -2.519 -2.830
(3.794) (8.578) (4.071) (6.077)
Upstr -11.422** -1.741
(5.846) (4.099)
lnIPR ∗ Upstr 6.785* 0.601
(3.921) (2.808)
lnSize(-1) 1.372*** 1.649*** 0.798*** 0.895***
(0.386) (0.527) (0.209) (0.221)
Age 0.206*** 0.178** 0.201*** 0.227***
(0.064) (0.073) (0.032) (0.039)
Ex prop(-1) 6.042*** 6.848*** 4.518*** 3.947***
(1.174) (1.899) (1.143) (1.206)
ln Kintensity(-1) 1.994*** 2.939*** -0.972*** -1.082***
(0.478) (0.594) (0.271) (0.297)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -1.724** -1.969** -1.208** -0.971*
(0.744) (1.009) (0.506) (0.525)
Debt assets(-1) -10.170*** -8.125*** -4.070*** -2.957**
(2.370) (2.716) (1.339) (1.354)
lnDist -0.116 -0.099 -0.297 -0.322
(0.435) (0.505) (0.320) (0.339)
lnGDP 0.280 0.235 -0.352* -0.393**
(0.324) (0.407) (0.190) (0.192)
lnGDPpc -0.466 -0.786 -1.096* -1.220*
(0.643) (0.836) (0.599) (0.629)
Constant 0.952 20.036 9.223 18.942
(11.297) (17.671) (10.527) (12.823)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -278.9142 -268.8527 -468.8406 -461.2941
Wald test chi2(17)= chi2(19)= chi2(17)= chi2(19)=
115.95*** 89.97*** 436.70*** 227.04***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
212.83*** 181.28 826.32*** 787.54***
Observations 155,087 155,087 200,575 200,575
No. of firm market prod 104,585 104,585 126,215 126,215
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 10: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level for knowledge intensity
downstream (i.e., double-split subsample); alternative combined rho× alpha and rho− alpha measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rho× alpha rho× alpha rho× alpha rho× alpha rho-alpha rho-alpha rho-alpha rho-alpha
(ind.) (ind.) (ind.) (ind.) (elast.) (elast.) (elast.) (elast.)
Comp Comp Subst Subst Comp Comp Subst Subst
rel upst knintk -5.005 -5.377 13.60* 12.866* -5.238 -5.274 10.54** 9.126**
(3.564) (3.666) (7.047) (7.467) (3.764) (3.738) (4.233) (3.996)
lnIPR -3.685 -8.351** -4.432 -0.416 -5.045** -10.49*** 0.467 1.309
(2.288) (3.413) (3.537) (7.383) (2.151) (3.769) (3.047) (5.154)
Upstr -4.501* 2.087 -4.904* -0.244
(2.393) (3.543) (2.566) (2.957)
lnIPR ∗ Upstr 2.695* -3.822 2.958* -0.331
(1.620) (2.803) (1.747) (1.998)
lnSize(-1) 0.0849 0.159 0.620*** 0.800*** 0.184 0.260* 0.365*** 0.459***
(0.107) (0.115) (0.212) (0.281) (0.154) (0.155) (0.110) (0.114)
Age 0.269*** 0.264*** 0.0257 0.035** 0.240*** 0.233*** 0.102*** 0.099***
(0.0383) (0.039) (0.0289) (0.033) (0.0425) (0.043) (0.0266) (0.026)
Ex prop(-1) 5.365*** 5.458*** 2.098*** 1.708** 5.780*** 5.959*** 3.872*** 3.700***
(1.029) (1.078) (0.751) (0.871) (1.404) (1.470) (0.827) (0.867)
ln Kintensity(-1) 0.771*** 0.844*** 0.0383 0.111 0.936*** 0.976*** 0.297 0.322
(0.241) (0.244) (0.307) (0.373) (0.245) (0.243) (0.234) (0.237)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -1.329*** -1.388*** 0.0876 0.091 -1.443*** -1.445** -1.029** -1.035**
(0.462) (0.456) (0.511) (0.602) (0.397) (0.395) (0.442) (0.437)
Debt assets(-1) -3.220*** -3.455*** 0.886 0.809 -3.038*** -3.136*** -4.082*** -4.172***
(0.962) (0.979) (1.011) (1.235) (1.087) (1.079) (0.924) (0.932)
lnDist -0.0935 -0.089 -0.560 -0.908 -0.242 -0.260 0.00715 0.010
(0.181) (0.192) (0.476) (0.596) (0.216) (0.222) (0.206) (0.217)
lnGDP -0.233* -0.281** 0.255 0.398 -0.319** -0.348** -0.236 -0.253*
(0.131) (0.133) (0.274) (0.331) (0.149) (0.149) (0.146) (0.149)
lnGDPpc -0.554* -0.625* -0.884 -0.960 -0.625* -0.671* -0.765** -0.717*
(0.315) (0.350) (0.751) (0.854) (0.366) (0.385) (0.389) (0.403)
Constant 8.064 18.052** -18.02 -20.600 14.14** 24.189*** -5.045 -3.779
(5.947) (7.865) (11.13) (14.516) (6.364) (8.173) (6.888) (8.812)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -656.8959 -648.3597 -154.9976 -268.8527 -522.7978 -514.4387 -493.4107 -481.2305
Wald test chi2(17)= chi2(19)= chi2(18)= chi2(20)= chi2(17)= chi2(19)= chi2(17)= chi2(19)=
98.50*** 106.32*** 23.35 25.18 90.48*** 93.79*** 130.06*** 120.57***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
896.09*** 862.98*** 103.50*** 64.78*** 386.85*** 356.24*** 213.54*** 194.69***
Observations 179,011 179,011 154,932 155,087 149,175 149,175 197,972 197,972
No. of
firm market prod. 117,954 117,954 104,408 104,585 103,857 103,857 129,282 129,282
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 11: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level for knowledge
intensity downstream (i.e., double-split subsample) on subsample of firms with increasing concen-
tration of sourcing from one country, rho-based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
above 10% above 10% above 20% above 20% above 30% above 30%
Comp Subst Comp Subst Comp Subst
rel upst knintk -19.23* 2.656 -20.04* 0.542 -30.18*** -1.048
(10.27) (5.878) (10.84) (5.476) (9.490) (7.864)
lnIPR -24.96*** -2.830 -25.54*** -1.113 -23.64*** 4.430
(8.578) (6.077) (8.310) (9.252) (7.715) (7.136)
Upstr -11.42* -1.741 -11.77** -0.722 -11.16* 1.746
(5.846) (4.099) (5.889) (5.010) (6.563) (4.370)
lnIPR ∗ Upstr 6.785* 0.601 7.013* -0.0884 6.006 -1.742
(3.921) (2.808) (3.955) (3.430) (4.375) (2.979)
lnSize(-1) 1.649*** 0.895*** 1.698*** 0.829*** 1.994*** 1.067***
(0.527) (0.221) (0.569) (0.200) (0.571) (0.333)
Age 0.178** 0.227*** 0.181** 0.202*** 0.0554 0.356***
(0.0733) (0.0388) (0.0753) (0.0395) (0.0679) (0.0548)
Ex prop(-1) 6.848*** 3.947*** 7.089*** 3.818*** 5.679*** 11.50***
(1.899) (1.206) (2.010) (1.148) (2.035) (3.666)
ln Kintensity(-1) 2.939*** -1.082*** 3.034*** -0.975*** 2.897*** -1.683**
(0.594) (0.297) (0.586) (0.275) (0.632) (0.711)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -1.969* -0.971* -1.998* -0.877* -1.152 -1.687
(1.009) (0.525) (1.062) (0.493) (0.939) (1.415)
Debt assets(-1) -8.125*** -2.957** -8.318*** -2.597** -9.874*** -3.007
(2.716) (1.354) (2.772) (1.281) (2.686) (2.141)
lnDist -0.0988 -0.322 -0.107 -0.303 -0.193 -0.354
(0.505) (0.339) (0.513) (0.325) (0.446) (0.417)
lnGDP 0.235 -0.393** 0.244 -0.387* 0.349 -0.406*
(0.407) (0.192) (0.405) (0.205) (0.348) (0.217)
lnGDPpc -0.786 -1.220* -0.825 -1.176* -0.0730 -1.363
(0.836) (0.629) (0.855) (0.656) (0.735) (0.841)
Constant 20.04 18.94 20.31 18.35 17.84 13.50
(17.67) (12.82) (18.15) (14.31) (17.29) (18.52)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -268.8527 -461.2941 -268.7725 -462.5582 -196.2061 -387.2041
Wald test chi2(19)= chi2(19)= chi2(19)= chi2(19)= chi2(17)= chi2(18)=
89.97*** 227.04*** 99.05*** 197.13*** 74.40*** 73.26***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
181.28*** 787.54*** 181.34*** 781.45*** 158.96*** 634.44***
Observations 155,087 200,575 154,321 195,135 109,507 126,557
No. of firm market prod 104,585 126,215 104,174 124,701 75,496 83,042
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 12: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level for knowledge
intensity downstream (i.e., double-split subsample) augmented with WGI interactions, rho-based
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rule of law Govern effectiveness Control corruption
Comp Subst Comp Subst Comp Subst
rel upst knintk -16.72* 1.347 -19.45** 2.314 -19.24* 3.414
(9.562) (5.557) (9.650) (5.774) (10.45) (6.244)
lnIPR -24.49*** -1.529 -26.13*** -1.688 -25.96*** -4.872
(7.740) (7.058) (8.371) (7.166) (8.315) (10.18)
Upstr -11.54** -0.535 -11.91** -0.515 -12.19** -2.494
(5.487) (4.341) (5.935) (4.303) (5.950) (5.269)
lnIPR ∗ Upstr 7.289* -0.291 7.333* -0.342 7.505* 1.171
(3.834) (3.061) (4.060) (3.045) (4.126) (3.665)
WGI 1.244 -0.719 0.323 -0.835 0.596 0.119
(1.217) (0.799) (1.259) (0.879) (1.107) (0.716)
WGI ∗ Upstr -0.454 0.103 -0.276 0.174 -0.245 -0.112
(0.521) (0.343) (0.566) (0.384) (0.491) (0.308)
lnSize(-1) 1.491*** 0.832*** 1.632*** 0.865*** 1.641*** 0.942***
(0.477) (0.211) (0.505) (0.220) (0.550) (0.230)
Age 0.157** 0.210*** 0.181** 0.219*** 0.174** 0.229***
(0.0652) (0.0383) (0.0725) (0.0369) (0.0729) (0.0376)
Ex prop(-1) 6.019*** 3.892*** 6.822*** 3.952*** 6.764*** 4.006***
(1.557) (1.180) (1.805) (1.203) (1.799) (1.223)
ln Kintensity(-1) 2.530*** -1.008*** 2.928*** -1.047*** 2.881*** -1.107***
(0.587) (0.289) (0.583) (0.297) (0.576) (0.301)
ln Lproductivity(-1) -1.603* -0.935* -2.006** -0.954* -1.859* -0.975*
(0.896) (0.507) (0.986) (0.520) (1.026) (0.540)
Debt assets(-1) -7.255*** -2.683** -8.121*** -2.922** -7.965*** -3.254**
(2.431) (1.303) (2.700) (1.329) (2.659) (1.396)
lnDist -0.0859 -0.268 -0.0754 -0.244 -0.122 -0.332
(0.486) (0.315) (0.526) (0.326) (0.537) (0.363)
lnGDP 0.201 -0.401** 0.232 -0.397** 0.236 -0.367*
(0.371) (0.190) (0.410) (0.196) (0.404) (0.215)
lnGDPpc -1.064 -0.476 -0.565 -0.549 -0.960 -1.017
(0.958) (0.853) (1.043) (0.830) (1.099) (1.094)
Constant 22.87 12.17 19.83 11.50 22.54 17.71
(16.48) (13.75) (18.35) (13.73) (18.49) (16.06)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -269.1421 -462.5164 -268.7403 -461.6240 -268.9165 -460.5996
Wald test chi2(21)= chi2(21)= chi2(21)= chi2(21)= chi2(21)= chi2(21)=
77.74*** 194.50*** 90.01*** 227.25*** 93.25*** 280.49***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob > chi2)
179.55*** 783.60*** 180.36*** 785.71*** 180.75*** 783.93***
Observations 155,087 200,575 155,087 200,575 155,087 200,575
No. of firm market prod 104,585 126,215 104,585 126,215 104,585 126,215
Note: Standard errors in in round brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Figure 1: The value-added (VA) components of gross exports, Slovenia 1995 and 2011.
(% share in total gross export)
Source: WTO.




Figure 3: Relative upstreamness of knowledge intensive inputs (rel upst knint) and import
demand elasticity (ρ) of product groups
Notes: 950210 - Dolls; representing only human beings; 611692 - Gloves, mittens and mitts; of cotton, knitted or
crocheted, (other than impregnated, coated or covered with plastics or rubber); 900610 - Cameras, photographic
(excluding cinematographic); of a kind used for preparing printing plates or cylinders; 845730 - Metal machines;
multi-station transfer machines, for working metal.
Figure 4: (Average) Marginal effects of the quality of IPR institutions for complements:
Knowledge intensity increasing downstream (left) and decreasing downstream (right)
Notes: Based on regression from Table 5, columns 1-2.
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Figure 5: (Average) Marginal effects of the quality of institutions for complements with relatively
more knowledge transmission upstream: IPRs (left) versus Rule of Law (right)
Notes: Based on regression from Table 5, columns 1 and 3.
Figure 6: Profit-maximizing division of surplus along the supply chain (relaxed problem).
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